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The European Convention on Human Rights: Collected Essays. By Loukis 
G. Loucaides. Leiden and Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2007. Pp. xiv, 
272. ISBN 9789004158832. €80.00, US$112.00. 
 
 The European Convention on Human Rights: Collected Essays is 
volume seventy in Nijhoff’s  Law Specials monographic series.  This volume 
consists of thirteen articles analyzing a variety of topics from the European 
Convention on Human Rights.  Seven of these articles have already been 
published in various legal sources, and they are compiled here in hopes of 
reaching a wider audience.  The author, Loukis G. Loucaides, is a judge on 
the European Court of Human Rights and a former member of the European 
Commission of Human Rights. He has written a similar work, "Essays on the 
Developing Law of Human Rights"1 that covers some of the same topics and 
jurisprudence discussed here. 
This volume provides an introductory discussion of human rights 
concepts in light of the Convention with an emphasis on decisions from the 
European Court of Human Rights.  Loucaides’ examination of the Court’s 
jurisprudence resembles a casebook approach with exhaustive examples and 
explanations that qualify this text to be a worthy secondary source to a novice 
in the international human rights arena.  
Loucaides does not shy away from criticizing the Court’s 
jurisprudence and encourages readers to also “be free to point out what they 
believe to be mistakes in a judgment and to disagree with the effects, provided 
they do so in good faith and recognize the binding nature of judicial 
decisions.”  He sets many examples throughout the text by scrutinizing some 
of the principal judgments of the Court.  For example, he criticizes the Court’s 
ruling in the Bankovic v. Belgium2and explains at length “that the grounds 
relied on by the Court make it an example of bad law influenced by the 
considerations relating to the factual situation.”  Loucaides expands his reach 
and also critiques the United States Supreme Court’s judgment in New York 
Times Co.  v. Sullivan.3  This section, in particular, may appeal to readers 
interested in an analytical comparative criticism of the jurisprudence on 
freedom of expression and its limits in the U.S. Supreme Court and the 
                                                 
1 Essays on the developing law of human rights.  Boston : M. Nijhoff Publishers, 
1995. 
2 (2001) 11 B.H.R.C. 435, (App. No.52207/99), decision of December 12, 2001. 
3 376 U.S. 254 (1964) 
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European Court of Human Rights.  Loucaides goes beyond jurisprudence and 
examines the doctrine and consequences. In chapter 12, he states, 
 
I think that the extension of the immunity from judicial review of 
political acts not only as regards the policy decisions but also as 
regards the consequences of such decisions on individual rights – 
especially on fundamental human rights – is unjustified. 
 
 Loucaides provides a rough framework of the European Convention 
on Human Rights and the ensuing jurisprudence with substantial commentary 
for the novice reader. The index is scant, some of the footnotes have 
incomplete citations, and the lack of a bibliography weakens this volume’s 
reference appeal.  However, it is an enjoyable read and the legal analysis is 
noteworthy. Therefore, I would still recommend it to an academic library with 




Arthur W. Diamond Law Library 
Columbia University School of Law 
New York, NY USA 
 
 
“A Decent Respect to the Opinions of Mankind...”: Selected Speeches by 
Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court on Foreign and International Law. 
Edited by Christopher J. Borgen. Washington: The American Society of 
International Law. Pp. xxxiv, 146. ISBN 0-9729423-7-8. US$20.00 
 
Christopher Borgen is to be commended on his compilation of 
speeches delivered by US Supreme Court Justices at the annual meetings of 
ASIL. He did not use every speech, but selected 11 that track the evolution of 
the American legal establishment’s perception of international law. The 
speeches date from 1922 to 2005 and are presented intact, as delivered.  
Borgen helpfully inserted a limited number of footnotes to identify people and 
“current events” referenced by the speakers and included a biographical 
summary for each Justice.    
In a lengthy Forward, Borgen explains his selection and thematic 
grouping of speeches, which reflect his interpretation of America’s reaction to 
and participation in the development of international law.  Initially, from 
1920-1943, the Justices were “looking outwards asking how international law 
could reorder international politics and what would be American’s role in 
ordering international law.” America was a “Nation of Laws” leading others 
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to a “Law of Nations.” A world federation of nations was perceived as a 
beneficial move forward. Even with the collapse of international cooperation 
in the 1930’s leading to World War II, Justice Hughes expressed a cautious 
optimism that American lawyers would focus on international issues and 
bring about changes at a grass roots level.  The second theme of international 
justice surfaced during the post-war period through the beginning of the Cold 
War.  The practical difficulty inherent in combining or blending two 
drastically different legal systems and legal philosophies (the common law 
and Communism) was articulated in several speeches. After a gap of almost 
50 years, a new theme could be seen; namely, the willingness of Justices to 
address international law in decisions and look to other nations for guidance. 
The “supranational” ideal of the 1920’s was replaced with the notion of 
“transjudicialism.”  The last theme is using foreign law in US courts as 
persuasive authority, a practice advocated by some current Justices and 
denigrated by others.  
The first group of speeches, by Justices Taft, Hughes, and Roberts, 
were delivered between 1920 and 1943.  The Justices were hopeful that 
international cooperation would result in a peace-keeping, dispute resolving 
institution and perhaps grow into a world federation of nations.  Although the 
United States ultimately distanced itself from efforts to establish a code of 
international law via the League of Nations and Permanent Court of 
International Justice, Justice Roberts looked towards a time where public 
sentiment would lead to a world organization to adjudicate and enforce 
international disputes. 
Three speeches by Justice Jackson between 1945 and 1952 illustrate 
the quest for international justice. Jackson’s participation in the Nuremberg 
Trials gives weight to his observation that there must be a common judicial 
philosophy among nations in order to foster justice.  He dwelt on the seeming 
intractable differences between the common law and Communism, and 
wondered how an International Criminal Court could reconcile the different 
systems. He seemed disappointed in the UN’s rush to adopt the Nuremberg 
principles without calm, deliberate consideration and without defining war 
crimes. 
The transjudicial theme was presented by Justices Blackmun and 
O’Conner in 1994 and 2002 respectively. They advocated learning from other 
nations and using conclusions by other countries as persuasive authority. The 
Supreme Court had to work with international law during a time of 
globalization. The US Supreme Court had issued decisions approving cross 
border kidnapping, turning away Haitian refugees on the high seas, and 
executing juveniles which Blackmun described as showing “something less 
that a ‘decent respect for the opinions of mankind’.”   
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The Court’s current use of foreign legal materials is discussed in 
speeches by Justices Breyer, Scalia, and Ginsburg. The Justices have 
divergent views on the issue, with Breyer and Ginsburg in favor of using 
foreign law when addressing issues of international import. Breyer refers to 
himself as a “comparativist” rather than an “internationalist.” Ginsburg asserts 
that the Supreme Court can learn from others, particularly in human rights 
matters. Justice Scalia places foreign legal materials on the same level as 
legislative history, which he disdains because it is unreliable yet used to 
bolster what he perceives to be bad opinions.  He bemoans using foreign laws 
in any way except the traditional uses of interpreting treaties and jurisdiction. 
He contends that the US does not want to be Europe. 
The speeches offer fascinating glimpses into social, political, and legal 
history. They also highlight the role of the American Society of International 
Law during the 20th century when US law had to come to terms with the 
growing relevance of international law. 
 
Jean M. Callihan 
Head of Research Services 
Cornell University Law Library 
Ithaca, NY USA 
 
 
The Law of Extradition and Mutual Assistance, 2nd ed. By Clive Nicholls, 
QC; Clare Montgomery, QC; and Julian B. Knowles. Oxford; New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2007. Pp. lxviii, 807. ISBN 978-0-19-929899-0. 
UK£145.00; US$275.00. 
 
The Law of Extradition and Mutual Assistance, 2nd ed., is a thorough 
examination of the United Kingdom’s current and historical laws and treaties 
governing extradition and mutual assistance, which have become hot topics 
after 9/11 and the commencement of the war on terrorism.  Nicholls and 
Knowles are lawyers in the United Kingdom with extensive experience in this 
area. 
Since the first edition was published in 2002, the relevant U.K. law 
has changed significantly. The U.K.’s Extradition Act 2003 replaced the 
Extradition Act 1989, and the U.K. passed the Crime (International Co-
operation) Act 2003 and the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (External Requests 
and Orders) Order 2005. In addition, the European Union enacted the 
European Arrest Warrant Act effective January 1, 2004, and the U.K. entered 
into a new extradition treaty with the United States in 2003. The second 
edition covers the law through January 1, 2007. 
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This book is divided into two parts. Part I is a comprehensive 
examination of the United Kingdom’s laws on extradition, covering both 
requests by foreign states for the extradition of defendants located in the U.K. 
and requests made by the U.K. for defendants located elsewhere.  Part II 
discusses mutual assistance, i.e., the U.K.’s cooperation with foreign states in 
the investigation and prosecution of criminal matters. 
Part I begins with an historical overview of the extradition laws of the 
United Kingdom, beginning with early extradition agreements and legislation 
such as the 1794 Jay Treaty between the U.K. and the U.S and ending with 
more recent acts such as the Extradition Act 2003. The latter part of the first 
chapter examines the U.K.’s 2003 extradition treaty with the United States. 
As discussed in this chapter, a noteworthy aspect of this treaty is the 
elimination of the requirement that the United States provide prima facie 
evidence in their extradition requests to the U.K., even though the U.K. is still 
required to provide this information in their extradition requests to the U.S.  
Chapter two contains an analysis of the Extradition Act 2003 and its 
predecessor, the Extradition Act 1989. The discussion is divided into two 
parts: (1) the circumstances under which a person can be extradited and (2) 
the offenses for which extradition can be granted. The 2003 Extradition Act 
divides states into two categories, referred to as Category 1 and Category 2 
territories. Requirements for and procedures of extradition requests in the 
U.K. vary depending on whether the state is a Category 1 or Category 2 
territory. This categorization is discussed thoroughly in Chapter 3, and the 
appendix contains a listing of the states in each category. 
Other aspects of the extradition process are examined in later 
chapters. These include the right to bail, burden of proof, powers of judges in 
extradition proceedings, time limits within which extradition has to take 
place, defendants’ consent to extradition, withdrawals of extradition requests 
by requesting states, procedures for U.K. requests to other states, right to 
appeal, and more.  
Chapter 7 is a discussion of human rights concerns in extradition 
cases.  The Extradition Act 2003 prohibits extradition if doing so would 
contravene the defendant’s rights under the European Convention on Human 
Rights.  Particular human rights are examined in this chapter, including the 
right to life, prohibition of torture, right to liberty and security, right to a fair 
trial, and respect for private and family law. The chapter ends with a 
discussion of the death penalty, which is prohibited in the Sixth Protocol to 
the Convention. As a party to the Convention, the U.K. may no longer 
extradite a defendant when there is a reasonable risk that the defendant will be 
sentenced to death. The final two chapters of Part 1 examine European arrest 
warrants and the extradition of defendants to international criminal tribunals. 
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Mutual cooperation between states in criminal matters is examined 
comprehensively in Part II (chapters 17-25). Mutual assistance in the U.K. is 
governed by two pieces of domestic legislation, the Crime (International Co-
operation) Act 2003 and the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (External Requests 
and Orders) Order 2005, and by a number of treaties, including the European 
Convention on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, the Convention 
on Driving Disqualifications, and the Agreement on Mutual Legal Assistance 
between the European Union and the United States. The relevant roles of the 
U.K. Central Authority and Serious Organised Crime Agency are also 
discussed.  
Additional topics in Part II include: cross-border surveillance by 
foreign officers; international information systems and mutual legal assistance 
institutions, including the European Police Office (Europol), the Schengen 
Information System, the Customs Information System, and Interpol; mutual 
assistance in service of process; mutual recognition of driving 
disqualifications within the European Union; interstate transfer of prisoners; 
and assistance with confiscation and forfeiture.  
The appendices include the following: the full text of the Extradition Acts of 
1870, 1989, and 2003; the European Arrest Warrant Framework Decision; the 
2003 U.K.-U.S. Extradition Treaty; Extradition Act 2003 (Multiple Offences) 
Order; a Listing of Category 1 and Category 2 territories; the Crime 
(International Co-operation) Act 2003; Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (External 
Requests and Orders) Order 2005; and the 2006 Mutual Legal Assistance 
Guidelines for the United Kingdom.The book also has a table of cases, table 
of legislation (U.K., E.U., and other national legislation), table of treaties, 
glossary, and an index. 
 
Beth DiFelice 
Assistant Director & Head of Public Services 
Ross-Blakley Law Library 
Arizona State University 
Phoenix, AZ USA 
 
 
From Mercenaries to Markets: The Rise and Regulation of Private 
Military Companies. Ed. Simon Chesterman and Chia Lehnardt. Oxford; 
New York: Oxford University Press, 2007. Pp. xx, 287. UK£60.00; 
US$110.00.  
 
From Mercenaries to Market: The Rise and Regulation of Private 
Military Companies is a compilation of scholarly works designed to present a 
thorough assessment of the challenges relating to the implementation of 
186 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF LEGAL INFORMATION [Vol. 36.1 
 
 
effective regulatory control over private military companies (“PMC”).  The 
chapters work in concert to bring the conceptualization of PMCs from 
“mercenary soldiers” to a 21st-century perspective.  Understanding the need to 
adjust perspectives is necessary in order to determine the level of regulatory 
controls to be exercised over PMCs.  Each of the well researched chapters 
builds upon the other, laying the groundwork for the reader to cultivate their 
own opinions about the volatile nature of relationships that exist between and 
within states juxtaposed against the multilayered roles that today’s PMCs play 
during times of conflict and times of transition.  The editors arranged From 
Mercenaries to Market into four topical sections:  (1) Concerns, (2) 
Challenges, (3) Norms, and (4) Markets.  Each section clusters related 
chapters together so as to allow the reader to be privy to the substantive and 
well supported arguments on the issue of regulatory control.   
In Part I, the three chapters that address “Concerns” set forth the 
foundation for the analysis. Sarah Percy’s “Morality and regulation” looks at 
the historical and moral objections to the private use of force.  Percy argues 
that moral objections can serve to drive the push towards enhancing 
regulatory policies designed to monitor the behaviors of private military 
companies.  Next, Kevin O’Brien takes the analysis one step further in “What 
should and what should not be regulated”.  O’Brien contends that PMC 
regulation should consist of a multilayered licensing system to license the 
company and the service capabilities.  O’Brien contends that a contractual 
notification requirement would help to facilitate adherence to each country’s 
policies.  Part I concludes with Anna Leander’s “Regulating the role of 
private military companies in shaping security and politics.”  Leander asserts 
that regulation of PMCs can be found through a combination of applying 
“export licensing systems and national humanitarian laws.”  The author 
argues that a key area that should be regulated more closely is the “role PMCs 
play in shaping security and politics.”  Leander also looks at how the 
regulatory mechanisms in place for public armed forces do not fit the rubric 
for the role PMCs play in shaping security and politics, thusly driving the 
need for the development of a regulatory mechanism specific to private 
military companies.      
Part II’s “Challenges” addresses governments at various levels of 
conflict and transition.  First, Angela McIntyre and Taya Weiss’s article 
“Weak governments in search of strength:  Africa’s experience of mercenaries 
and private military companies” presents an analysis of the state of the 
African nation and how mercenary soldiers have evolved to become PMCs.  
The authors look at the components of regulation from the “context of the 
profound governance problems that face Africa today.”  They do this by 
analyzing the legitimacy of “lethal force” against the [need for] “logistical 
support to peacekeeping operations [in African countries].”  
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David Isenberg’s chapter, “A government in search of cover; Private 
military companies in Iraq,” begins with an assessment of how the effects of 
the end of the Cold War influenced the increased presence of PMCs.  The 
presence of PMCs in Iraq is viewed as a direct result of an underestimation of 
the number of troops needed to provide subsequent “stability and protection” 
during the transition period.  Even though regulations exist, there is still a low 
level of public accountability in place to monitor and censure behaviors.  Part 
II ends with Elke Krahmann’s “Transitional states in search of support: 
Private military companies and security sector reform.”  The author provides 
an analysis of the “challenges posed by the involvement of PMCs in military 
assistance and security sector reform.”   Krahmann divides the chapter into 
sections that discuss: (1) the nature of security sector reform, (2) the reasons 
for the employment of PMCs, (3) the challenges faced for hiring private 
military contractors by transitional and donor states, and (4) an analysis of 
how the “challenges have been or might be resolved.”  
The “Norms” analysis is presented in three chapters that look at 
regulatory expectations.  Louise Doswald-Beck’s chapter, “Private military 
company under international humanitarian law,” is an examination of 
“existing law and its application to PMCs.”  The author includes a discussion 
of the parts of international humanitarian law that are relevant to the 
regulation of PMCs.   How states that employ PMCs have a duty to recognize 
the applicability of international law is addressed in Chia Lehnardt’s “Private 
military companies and state responsibility.”  The author sets forth the 
argument that the duty of states to regulate PMCs is not lessened because of 
the utilitarian purposes served by them.  “Domestic regulation: Licensing 
regimes for the export of military goods and services” is Marina Caparini’s 
discussion and analysis of how the sale of private contract military and 
security services are regulated.  Caparini looks at the methods behind the sale 
of these types of services and the laws that are applied to the process.  
Caparini’s analysis focuses on the national regulatory systems employed by 
the United States and South Africa.   
From Mercenaries to Marketplace concludes with Part IV, 
“Markets,” which begins with Deborah Avant’s chapter on “The emerging 
market for private military services and the problems of regulation.”  Avant 
focuses on the “emergence of the market for force,” and how an assessment of 
the character of the market along with considering some of the challenges 
faced by the market can lead to better regulatory policies.   The question of 
whether states should make their own security or buy their security is the 
focus of James Cockayne’s “Make or buy?: Principle-agent theory and the 
regulation of private military companies.”  The delegated authority received 
by agents [PMCs] may reduce the principle’s [transitional and donor states] 
level of awareness and control over their activities and behaviors.  Cockayne 
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looks at the problems faced by principles, the implications for PMCs, and the 
process toward developing better structured procedural and behavioral 
requirements.     
In “Contract as a tool for regulating private military companies,” 
Laura Dickinson looks at how contracts could be used as a viable means of 
regulation.  The author examines six possible objections that could be made 
by policymakers and scholars to developing contracts as a method of 
employing regulatory oversight.  Dickinson asserts that contract language 
reform is but one of the many means that can be used to regulate PMCs.   
Andrew Bearpark and Sabrina Schulz’ “The future of the market” reminds the 
reader of the complex nature of assessing and regulating the PMC market.  
Based upon this complexity, the authors contend that the need exists to 
consider regulating PMCs through simultaneously introduced levels of actions 
and procedures.  Methods to consider include the exercise of some level of 
self-regulation as well as implementing national and international 
components.   The authors use some of the aspects from the regulatory debate 
in Britain to develop their argument about the future of the PMC market.  In 
the last chapter of Part IV, “Conclusion: From mercenaries to market,” Simon 
Chesterman and Chia Lehnardt summarize the previous chapters and present 
arguments to stimulate future discussion on the topic.  Reminders of the 
limited regulatory control exercised by the governments that hire PMCs to act 
on their behalf are offered in a manner that jars the reader to acknowledge the 
need for improvements. Chesterman and Lehnardt show how the damaging 
effects of limited regulatory control strengthens the importance of developing 
and promoting a far reaching regulatory schema.  
For better or worse, the discussion on the role of PMCs and their 
regulation will be ripe for many years to come.  From Mercenaries to 
Marketplace provides an extremely timely and in-depth discussion of aspects 
of the PMC market.  Each chapter is richly researched and clearly presented.  
The presentation of theories is supported by factual events and references to 
primary resources. Other value-added features include the table of cases, table 
of treaties and legislation, the select bibliography, and the index.  From 
Mercenary to Marketplace provides a schematic that can be used to shepherd 
the reader’s development of a well thought out opinion on the various forms, 
methods, and rationales behind regulating private military companies. 
 
Veronica A. Foster 
Instruction Services Librarian 
Arthur Neef Law Library 
Wayne State University 
Detroit, MI USA 
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International Crimes and the Ad Hoc Tribunals. By Guénaël Mettraux. 
London; New York: Oxford University Press, 2006. Pp. xi, 442. ISBN 0-19-
920754-2. UK£29.99; US$55.00. 
 
Athanase Seromba was a Catholic priest at Nyange Parish, Kibuye 
Prefecture, Rwanda.  In April 2004, 2,000 Tutsi refugees were sheltered in his 
church in Nyange Parish.  He was accused of ordering his own church 
destroyed resulting in the death of 1,500 Tutsis sheltered inside.  Prosecutors 
claimed that he had the church demolished by bulldozers and ordered 
militiamen to kill the survivors in the church with machetes and guns.  
Athanase Seromba was found guilty by the International Criminal Tribunal 
for Rwanda (ICTR) of the crime of genocide and crime against humanity 
(extermination) on December 13, 2006.  He was sentenced to 15 years in 
prison.  Unhappy with his verdict Seromba appealed to the Appeals Chamber.  
On March 12, 2008 the Appeals Chamber overturned the conviction of 
Athanase Seromba and increased his sentence from 15 years imprisonment to 
life imprisonment.4  
 What type of courts deals with crimes of this nature?  What type of 
appeals court can increase a 15 year sentence to life imprisonment?  Guénaël 
Mettraux’s International Crimes And The Ad Hoc Tribunals explains the laws 
that are applied by the United Nations International Criminal Tribunals for the 
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and for Rwanda (ICTR). 
 Mr. Mettraux is well qualified to write this book.  He was a legal 
assistant to the Judges of the Ad Hoc Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
where he later served as defense counsel.  As an international criminal law 
practitioner he has written a book that is impressive for its organization and 
documentation of the case law for the ICTY and ICTR. 
 The foreword by His Honour David Hunt, a former Judge of the 
ICTY and Appeals Chamber, says this book is “first and foremost a practical 
guide to the law of the tribunals as it has developed over their lifetime and as 
the law applied today.” This work is notable for its historical coverage of 
international criminal law. There are many references to the Nuremberg 
Tribunals in the discussion of the case law of the Tribunals for the former 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda.  
The book is arranged into eight parts.   Part I discusses the Ad Hoc 
Tribunals’ subject matter jurisdiction and the applicable law applied in the 
ICTY and ICTR.  Mettraux looks at the important role of the judges in the Ad 
                                                 
4International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Completed Cases.  28. Seromba, 
Athanase (ICTR-2001-66), 
< http://www.ictr.org> (last visited April 14, 2008).  
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Hoc Tribunals as they balance the customary international law and existing 
state practices.   
Parts II, III and IV cover war crimes, crimes against humanity, and 
genocide.  The chapeau or general requirements of the crimes are discussed at 
length, and each crime is explained element by element.  Examples of case 
law relating to the elements of the criminal law are used throughout the work.  
Each section is heavily footnoted and documented.  
Individual criminal responsibility, jurisdiction ratione personae, and 
the applicable laws are discussed in Part V.  Part VI addresses the legal 
distinctions between genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.  The 
relevant factors in sentencing such as the gravity of the acts, any mitigating or 
aggravating factors, and the totality of the culpable conduct of the accused are 
explained in Part VII.  This is a very helpful section because “neither the 
Statutes of the Tribunals, nor applicable precedents, offer much guidance” in 
sentencing.  
Part VIII includes the author’s concluding remarks.  He expresses the 
hope that “prosecution and punishment of crimes committed in the former 
Yugoslavia and in Rwanda made us . . . less cynical about our ability to do 
something about such atrocities, and thus a little bit more responsible when 
we fail to act.”  
The book includes a table of cases, an extensive bibliography, 
including helpful websites, and an index.  The annex includes United Nations 
resolutions for the ICTY and ICTR. 
International criminal law is a developing area that is “incomplete and 
fragmentary” and Mettraux has provided a much needed book on the laws of 
the Ad Hoc Tribunals.  International Crimes and the Ad Hoc Tribunals is 
recommended for academic libraries that collect international human rights 
materials and the international criminal law practitioner. 
 
Paula Hoffman 
Foreign and International Law Librarian 
LA Law Library 
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Political Rights under Stress in 21st Century Europe (The Collected Courses 
of the Academy of European Law), vol. xv/3. Edited by Wojciech Sadurski. 
Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2006. Pp. vii, 288. ISBN 0-19-
929603-0. UK£22.50; US$40.00. 
 
 As the title implies, this book addresses the issue of political rights in 
Europe.  The introduction to the book, prepared by the editor, Wajcieckh 
Sadurski, provides a very useful discussion regarding the difficult, and at 
times controversial, issue of defining what rights are political rights.  While 
Sadurski initially asserts that to some degree "[a]ll rights are political,” he 
acknowledges the need to define political rights in a "more precise way." 
Political rights are thus defined as "the rights that are instrumental, and 
perhaps indispensable, to the participation of citizens in the exercise of 
political power in their society.” 
 Writing that "[e]ach historical moment imparts upon the discussion of 
those rights it own special concern,” Sadurski notes that context influences 
the discussion of political rights.  It is this discussion that provides a more 
generous view into the actual content of the book.  While most readers would 
expect the book to address the stress placed on political rights as political 
institutions respond to terrorism, Sadurski notes that the "much happier 
phenomenon" of a significant number of previously authoritarian states 
transitioning to more democratic systems must also influence a discussion of 
political rights. 
 Six quality essays addressing the theme of defining political rights in 
times of stress follow Sadurski's excellent introduction.  The contributors of 
these essays are all legally trained academics, who in addition to their training 
in law have expertise in areas such as comparative studies, human rights, and 
philosophy. 
 In the first essay, Michel Rosenfeld, Professor of Human Rights at the 
Cardozo School of Law, furthers the discussion, begun in the introduction, 
that context must influence political rights.  Rosenfeld concentrates on the 
idea that pluralism provides "a logic and dialectic that allow for a 
determination of the particular political rights that are best suited for a given 
circumstance." The circumstances Rosenfeld discusses include ordinary 
times, times of stress and time of crisis.  He differentiates between times of 
stress, and time of crisis based on factors such as the "severity, intensity, and 
duration" of the threat to which the "polity" is reacting.  Thus, he concludes 
that a military invasion or widespread civil insurrection would likely lead to a 
crisis while the response to a limited terrorist attack has created times of 
stress. Through examples including responses to hate speech and terrorism, 
Rosenfeld illustrates that in times of stress restrictions on political rights may 
be more or less "extensive" depending on whether there is a need to 
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strengthen the "polity" or to prevent conflict between groups from degrading 
to such an extent that crisis occurs. 
 The Rosenfeld essay is followed by a discussion of political rights 
within the European Union by Damian Chalmers, Professor of European 
Union Law at the London School of Economics and Political Science.  
Chalmers emphasizes the fact that while the EU has some attributes of a state, 
it is primarily a market based society.  As a result, the "political reason" of the 
EU is the protection of the market society. The essay sets forth three 
principles on which this political reason is based:  "pourousness, regulatory 
authorship, and mutual public private accountability." While Chalmers 
recognizes that the market society may be "vulnerable to a wide range of 
forms of stress" that may necessitate EU responses, he dedicates a significant 
portion of the essay to explaining how the stress resulting from terrorism 
evidences the existence of three counter principles: "suspicion, public-private 
police and collective victimhood." It is in the section on victimhood that 
Chalmers most poignantly makes the argument that in response to terrorism, 
the EU has implemented policies that impose a burden on the rights of 
minority groups, such as immigrants and asylum seekers.  The burden on 
these groups is justified, under the "political reason" of the EU, because these 
groups are seen as potential threats to the market society. 
 The third essay, by Victor Comella, Professor of Constitutional Law 
at Pompeu Fabra University, explores the "doctrinal framework" of the 
European protection of free speech through an examination of the decisions of 
the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). The essay begins by 
examining the contrast between the "legal regime" set forth by the United 
States Supreme Court's decisions on free speech with that followed by the 
ECHR.  Comella then explores the question of whether "introduction of some 
of the American rules would be beneficial" to the protection of free speech.  
Finally, the essay discusses "whether it is justified for the law to introduce 
exceptions to the general principle that all speakers should be subjected to the 
same legal restrictions." This discussion considers two particular situations: 
speech by members of Parliament and speech by and regarding judges. 
 Party closures is the subject of the fourth essay by Eva Brems, 
Professor of Human Rights and Non-Western Law at Ghent University.  As 
Brems defines the phrase, “party closures” refers to "the prohibition or forced 
dissolution of a political party by a government authority."  Brems 
acknowledges that forced dissolution of a political party is a "far-reaching" 
restriction on the freedom of political association. Notwithstanding the serious 
nature of such a restriction, Brems' essay explores whether party closure may 
be justified if a party's programs and activities threaten human rights or 
promotes and incites racial discrimination.  Such a situation, according to 
Brems, produces a "democratic dilemma" whether "paradoxically" 
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fundamental rights should be restricted "for the purpose of protecting 
fundamental rights." Brems uses decisions of the ECHR, with particular 
attention given to 2003 case of Rafah Partisi (the Welfare Party) and others v. 
Turkey, as well as national court decisions and other sources to present 
situations that have given rise to dilemmas regarding party closure, and to 
illustrate the variance in criteria that have been advocated to resolve these 
democratic dilemmas. 
 The editor of the book co-authors the fifth essay along with Jiří 
Přibáň, Professor of Law at Cardiff University and Visiting Professor of Legal 
Philosophy and Sociology at Charles University.  The essay discusses the role 
of political rights in the context of the stress resulting from the transition of 
previously authoritarian regimes to democratic governments.  Přibáň and 
Sadurski divide the Central and Eastern European (CEE) states into two 
groups.  Poland and Hungary are included in the group of states which 
underwent democratization through processes in which the government 
negotiated with opposing political forces and used existing procedures to 
accommodate change. The other group of states includes those states whose 
governments continued to resist and addressed matters only after 
"revolutionary crowds" challenged the government.  It was these different 
environments that influenced "alternative interpretations of basic and political 
rights.” Yet, the authors conclude, 
 
[a]t the level of the organization of state institution standards 
achieved in the building of such institutions safeguarding political 
rights have been quite impressive in the CEE states overall.  
However, the robustness of political rights depends on the institutions 
of civil society …with incentives, capacities, and the necessary 
resources to claim their political rights. 
 
 The sixth and final essay in the book logically follows the previous 
chapter in that it addresses the political rights of a specific group, national 
minorities, in the context of democratic expansion.  Gwendolyn Sasse, a 
senior lecturer in Comparative European Politics at the London School of 
Economics and Political Science, divides her essay into two parts, promising 
in part one to "place the issue of minority rights in the wider legal and 
theoretical context." In considering context, she notes that in the EU "the 
traditional link between citizenship and political rights has become more 
tenuous" in part because of the "elaboration of EU citizenship and a wider 
range of forms of political participation." Further, while she concludes that 
minority rights should be classified as political rights, she recognizes that 
social and economic rights have been emphasized in dealings with "new 
minorities" while cultural identity and political representation have been de-
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emphasized.  In the second portion of the essay, Sasse states that she will 
"draw on the experience of Central and Eastern Europe to analyse the politics 
of minority rights."  Perhaps more descriptively, a significant portion of the 
second part of the essay is dedicated to an assessment of “the contribution of 
the European Union and its agenda of 'conditionality' to securing" minority 
rights.”5   Concluding that while the EU has perhaps brought minority rights 
into the "political rhetoric," it has been the efforts of the Council of Europe, 
the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and 
nongovernmental organizations that have contributed to minority rights and 
protections being “translated” into “domestic Political context.” 
 I concur with the opinion of another reviewer that "the volume is 
invaluable as a source book on the problems of implementing political rights 
not just under conditions of transition to democracy, but more generally in the 
'stressful' conditions of pluralist societies divided, sometimes bitterly, by 
cultural, political and philosophical differences."6  However, perhaps because 
I am trained in law rather than political science, I do not concur with the 
criticism that the "thorough use of legal sources" adversely affects the 
readability.7 However, there are a few references scattered throughout essays 
to European programs or terms of Greek origin that might cause confusion to 
some readers.8  Nor do I, with limited exception, "regret the absence of more 
direct and fuller analysis of the concepts of 'stress' and of 'militant 
democracy'."9  It is only in the third essay that I found myself desiring that the 
author would more fully analyze how times of stress had influenced the 
development of free expression protections.  Despite this unfulfilled  
 
 
                                                 
5 John Schwarzmantel, (Book Review), e-Extreme (Electronic Newsletter of the 
European Consortium for Political Research Standing Group on Extremism and 
Democracy), December 2007,  
http://www.tufts.edu/~dart01/extremismanddemocracy/newsletter/Book8_4.htm  
6 Id. 
7 Id.  
8 For example, Přibáň and Sadurski make reference to "the assistance program, 
PHARE". Přibáň and Sadurski, supra note 18, at 207.  Established in 1989, PHARE 
was the Poland Hungary Assistance for Restructuring their Economies.  PHARE was 
later expanded to include assistance to other nations.  In 2007, IPA, the Instrument for 
Pre-accession Assistance, replaced other forms of pre-accession assistance including 
PHARE.     European Union, Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance, 
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/funds/ipa/index_en.htm  
9 Schwarzmantel, supra note 26. 
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expectation, the third essay is a work of excellent quality and the book as a 
whole should be added to any library desiring to have a collection that 
addresses the contextual nature of human rights. 
 
Darla W. Jackson 
Head of Reference and Access Services 
Oklahoma City University Law Library 




Constitutional Interpretation: The Basic Questions. By Sotirios A. Barber 
and James E. Fleming. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2007. 
Pp. xvi, 201. ISBN: 978-0-19-532858-5. UK£15.99; US$29.95. 
 
How should the Constitution be read? What are the main arguments 
supporting different approaches to interpreting the Constitution? Does the 
plain text of the Constitution speak for itself? What was the intent of the 
framers when they drafted the Constitution? Do the Constitution’s structural 
principles or Supreme Court’s prior cases provide sufficient information for 
interpretation? Can the Constitution be fully understood without looking 
beyond its boundaries? These are some of the questions posed in Sotirios A. 
Barber and James E. Fleming’s Constitutional Interpretation: The Basic 
Questions. However, the baseline question asked is “which approach to the 
meaning of the Constitution is best.” In trying to determine how to properly 
answer this question, the authors review and discuss different theories of 
interpretation by noted constitutional scholars and jurists.  
In the first chapter, Mr. Barber and Mr. Fleming begin with a 
comparison of two approaches to understanding the Constitution: William 
Reinquist’s “fidelity to the framers’ intent” and Ronald Dworkin’s “fusion of 
constitutional law and moral philosophy.” Using articles written by Reinquist 
and Dworkin, the chapter sets out these opposing theories, which provides a 
backdrop for the material presented in the rest of the book. It is clear that the 
authors favor Dworkin’s theory. Dworkin’s “moral reading” is what the 
authors discuss as the philosophic approach and is the interpretative method 
advocated by them throughout the book.  
Subsequent chapters proceed to assess critically a number of different 
interpretative theories: textualism, consensualism, narrow 
originalism/intentionalism, broad originalism, structuralism, doctrinalism, 
minimalism, and pragmatism. In each chapter, Mr. Barber and Mr. Fleming 
cite to the noted advocates of the particular theory.  As examples, in 
reviewing textualism, Justice Hugo Black’s dissent in Griswold v. 
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Connecticut is the focus, and in the chapter on structuralism there are 
numerous references to John Hart Ely. According to the authors, one factor in 
all these theories is that they “claim to avoid the need for a fusion of 
constitutional law and moral philosophy.” After presenting a full and clear 
explanation of the main components of each theory, the key aspect of each 
chapter is to show how despite the claim, it is not possible to avoid some sort 
of philosophic choice or consideration in applying the theories to the 
Constitution.   
While arguments related to the philosophic approach are interlaced 
into the discussion of all the other theories, chapter ten focuses on this theory 
of interpretation. It presents a clear example of the approach at work, using 
the “separate but equal” doctrine and the progression from Plessy v. Ferguson 
to Brown v. Board of Education. This chapter also addresses the major 
objections to the philosophic approach, which were introduced briefly in the 
last section of Chapter Five. Chapter ten, in conjunction with the Epilogue, 
shows how the philosophic approach incorporates specific aspects of the other 
theories of interpretation in order to arrive at the best possible meaning for the 
Constitution and constitutional language.  
Constitutional Interpretation: The Basic Questions is well written and 
gives the reader a clear understanding of its premise and its arguments. The 
authors, who have collaborated previously, are both professors: Sotirios 
Barber in political science at Notre Dame and James Fleming in law at 
Fordham. Their knowledge of the subject of constitutional interpretation is 
impressive and their writing style is fluid and well-paced. Constitutional 
Interpretation: The Basic Questions would be valuable to both constitutional 
scholars interested in a new look at the area of interpretation and to scholars 
new to the area who are interested in learning about a number of different 




Arthur W. Diamond Law Library 
Columbia Law School 









2008] BOOK REVIEWS       197 
 
 
Lumb and Moens’: The Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia. 
Annotated. 7th ed. By Gabriël A. Moens and John Trone. Chatswood NSW: 
LexisNexis Butterworths, 2007. Pp. xxxix, 544. ISBN: 9780409323658. 
AU$135.00. 
 
All academic law libraries with any interest in collecting legal 
information about Australia should have a good annotated constitution of 
Australia.  Lumb & Moens' The Constitution of the Commonwealth of 
Australia Annotated meets this need and would be a good addition to any 
library collecting Australian constitutional law material. 
The 7th edition (2007) is very similar in format to the 6th edition 
(2002), but includes useful updated information covering changes in 
Australian federal constitutional law since January 2000.  Substantive changes 
include information about new decisions discussing the implied freedom of 
political communication, the scope of the “aliens power” enumerated in 
section 51, the scope of the executive power, the constitutionality of indefinite 
immigration detention, the functions of a judge and jury, and the territory self-
government statutes.  Updated annotations include references to new case 
law, legal treatises, and law journal articles.  Additionally, there is an updated 
bibliography that can be used for further research, and a new list of web sites 
focusing on Australian constitutional law.  The web site listing is only a 
couple pages long, but it includes some very useful links, such as the 
Australian parliament web site with the full-text of the original convention 
debates from the 1890s and the constitutional debates from 1998.   
   Lumb & Moens covers the Constitution of the Commonwealth of 
Australia section by section.  Each section includes the text of the 
constitutional provision in an easy-to-read grey-shaded box, which is then 
followed by a discussion of what that particular section means.  The book is 
not comprehensive in that it does not include all cases that have interpreted 
each section; rather, the authors have selected the cases, treatises, and law 
journal articles they have determined to be the most important.  It does cover 
all 128 articles of the constitution, with annotations detailing the history and 
changing interpretations of each section.  The authors have made an obvious 
effort to provide more details about sections that have been more 
controversial or are simply more important.  For example, there is a lot of 
discussion about section 51, which enumerates the legislative powers of 
Parliament.  This section provides:  “The Parliament shall, subject to this 
Constitution, have power to make laws for the peace, order, and good 
government of the Commonwealth with respect to: (i) Trade and commerce 
with other countries, and among the States, (ii) Taxation; but so as not to 
discriminate between States or parts of States, . . .” and thirty-seven additional 
matters.  There is significant discussion of each of these thirty-nine legislative 
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powers of the Parliament, with citations to numerous cases and law review 
articles. 
Lumb & Moens also includes an excellent forty page introduction to 
the Australian Constitution.  This overview discusses the history of the 
adoption of the Constitution and other issues (such as the structure of the 
Constitution) that don’t neatly fall within one of the sections of the 
Constitution.  It is extremely helpful that Lumb & Moens refers to other 
important Australian constitutional commentaries such as The Annotated 
Constitution of the Australian Commonwealth, by Sir John Quick & Sir 
Robert R. Garran, published in 1901.  While not current, Quick & Garran is a 
much cited historical constitutional commentary, since the authors 
participated in or observed the convention debates in the 1890s. 
Other contemporary texts on Australian constitutional law include Australian 
Constitutional Law and Theory: Commentary and Materials, by Blackshield 
& Williams (4th ed., 2006); Sawer's: The Australian Constitution, by Aitken 
& Orr (3rd ed., 2002); and Lane's Commentary on the Australian 
Constitution, (2nd ed., 1997.)  Even if your library already has these three 
titles, Lumb & Moens would be a good addition to your library’s Australian 
constitutional law collection because Australian Constitutional Law is more 
of a casebook, Sawer's is from 2002, and Lane's Commentary is from 1997.  
On the other hand, a library looking to buy one good book on the Australian 
constitution would find a good choice in Lumb & Moens' The Constitution of 
the Commonwealth of Australia Annotated. 
 
Vincent Moyer 
Foreign, Comparative & International Law Librarian 
Hastings College of the Law Library 




Scholarly Communication in China, Hong Kong, Japan, Korea and 
Taiwan. Edited by Jingfeng Xia. Oxford: Chandos Publishing, 2008. Pp. 200. 
ISBN 978-1843343226. UK£59.95; US$110.00. 
 
 The phrase “scholarly communication” may mean a variety of 
scholarly interactions corresponding to the interests of different academic 
disciplines. Before I opened this recently published book edited by Jingfeng 
Xia, I assumed that it would describe the process and/or effects of 
communications within the higher education in East Asia by exploring the 
prospects of international scholarly collaboration bound by historically, 
economically, legally or technologically diverse and complex locations. But 
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Scholarly Communication in China, Hong Kong, Japan, Korea and Taiwan 
defines scholarly communication as “the system through which research and 
other scholarly writings are created, evaluated for quality, disseminated to the 
scholarly community, and preserved for future use.” 
 As a result, the book compares academic research and library use in 
different Asian regions. More specifically, it describes how the educational 
system and scholarly tradition of higher education in these five Asian regions 
operate, and how such traditions have been facing the new phenomena of 
internationalization and digitization of library information. The circumstances 
in Mainland China, Hong Kong and Macao, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan 
are described in individual chapters by scholars who have studied library and 
information science in one of these regions and/or in the West. Each chapter 
offers an informative essay about each region’s scholarly research system, 
including the historical context of intellectual tradition and academic systems, 
information regarding how and what kind of academic journals are published 
locally, how libraries are operated, and what kinds of research tools are 
available. Moreover, the essays include insights and trends in academic 
infrastructures, academic traditions and intellectual history, library resources 
and electronic scholarship, and the publishing industry in these regions. 
 Because of the increasing interest in research on East Asia by the 
academicians from the West, the benefit of this book is clear. It offers 
resourceful information and insights by scholars who understand the academic 
systems of both the West and East Asia. Their knowledge, experience, and 
perspectives of the local culture and intellectual history contribute to the 
research in these non-English speaking locations, in which scholars trained in 
western academic systems often encounter difficulties in utilizing or 
manipulating research tools that are too unfamiliar or too obscure. Also, as 
noted in the book, it is a sizeable task for any researcher to look for non-
English scholarly articles of any kind because the academic environments of 
these regions are built on politically, or culturally-endorsed intellectual 
traditions. The efficiency of western research systems may not be seen as a 
valuable contribution to the academic research in such a context. Furthermore, 
scholarly communications in these regions are less electronic-based, or 
English-supported, even though such a conversion is anticipated. Thus, this 
book is a good guide to show the readers the differences and provides precise 
and effective tools to those who are interested in research in these areas. 
 Besides the fact that the book is very resourceful to academicians 
whose research is related to East Asia, it is also quite apparent that the essays 
in this book can be further developed for an in-depth analysis of cultural 
communication. For instance, in the chapter regarding Japan by Hitoshi 
Kamada, it is noted that it has been a long tradition in Japan that Japanese 
universities reserve library space and resources for the exclusive use of their 
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institution. Initially, readers might wonder how and why this tradition was 
established. Does it indicate an elitism in Japanese higher education that tries 
to keep out the lower classes that do not possess adequate cultural capital? Is 
it a part of the bureaucratic scheme that tries to minimize the cost of running 
the library? By securing their intellectual asset to the limited membership, 
what is the authority trying to protect?? The critical analysis to understand the 
distribution of information to the public through regional libraries would be 
appreciably interesting because it concerns the larger understanding of each 
society’s control over the distribution of knowledge to the public. 
 Equally or more important, the political and historical situations 
between different regions in East Asia affect the uneven and manipulated 
distribution of academic knowledge in the area. For instance, as Steven K. 
Luk illustrates, certain politically sensitive topics may not be published in 
Mainland China; thus, those who want to express views that are not officially 
approved are encouraged to publish in Hong Kong. Such a commentary might 
sound cliché to those who are too familiar with information control and 
governmental oppression, but it also delivers a realistic vision of the problems 
that academicians in less democratic societies must face in everyday life. A 
more in-depth critical exploration of such academic environments would 
perhaps offer fascinating insights regarding the role of academic research and 
the responsibility of academicians in this fast growing and politically dynamic 
region. 
 Overall, the book is valuable to readers who are involved in library 
research on the subject of East Asia, especially whose interests are in the 
social sciences and humanities. In addition, the book could be an introduction 
to the further examination of cultural communication. The only concern is 
that because some of the information provided in the book is time-sensitive, in 
order to provide accurate information, there may need to be a revision within 
a short period. If a frequent revision is not possible, offering an online link to 
the updated information could assist the need for the latest information. Such 
additional support for readers would not only be helpful but would also 
further the interest of library science professionals and initiate further 
discussions and activities related to scholarly communication in regions that 
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The Netherlands in Court: Essays in Honour of Johan G. Lammers. Edited 
by Niels Blokker, René Lefeber, Liesbeth Lunzaad, and Ineke Van Bladel. 
Leiden; Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2006.  Pp. vii, 265. ISBN 90-
04-15705-0. €95.00; US$128.00. 
 
Until his retirement in 2005, Johan G. Lammers was a Legal Advisor 
and Head of the International Law Division in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
of the Kingdom of the Netherlands (“The Ministry”).  An expert in 
international law, particularly international environmental law, Lammers 
played a prominent role in representing the Netherlands before various 
international bodies and tribunals throughout his career.  This collection of 
essays, written entirely by colleagues and former colleagues of his from the 
Ministry, highlights a few of Lammers’ contributions in detail.   
Although the collection has no formal divisions, the twelve essays fall 
into three broad categories: 1) those dealing with disputes in which the 
Netherlands came or could have come as a party before international courts or 
arbitral tribunals; 2) those dealing with cases in which individuals may appear 
before international courts or bodies; and 3) those dealing with the application 
of international law in domestic court proceedings. 
Each essay in the collection offers a highly detailed account of an 
international legal dispute or law-making body, most through the lens of how 
the dispute or body has affected or could affect the Netherlands.  Although the 
essays deal with practical issues of international governance and adjudication, 
they also offer a thorough theoretical treatment of their topics including 
historical overviews of international bodies and discussions and predictions 
about how various legal issues have and will play out in the international and 
domestic arena.  Several of the essays include detailed and highly technical 
case studies of disputes in which the Netherlands was involved, explaining 
how and why a certain outcome was achieved.   
Although the overall focus of the book is on how the Netherlands has 
responded to the increased influence of international law, most of the essays 
use this theme as a jumping off point to discuss issues with broader 
implications.  Several of the essays discuss the obligation of nations to 
comply with the laws and opinions handed down by international 
organizations of which they are members.  How much force should 
international opinions have in domestic courts?  When has a country 
submitted to the jurisdiction of an international court or tribunal?  How does 
an uncertain international law landscape affect the administration and 
effectiveness of international bodies?  These are only some of the challenging 
questions tackled in this collection. 
Several of the essays touch on similar topics through different lenses.  
For example, multiple pieces look at international bodies charged with 
202 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF LEGAL INFORMATION [Vol. 36.1 
 
 
adjudicating human rights violations.  Chapter four discusses the International 
Criminal Court in great detail, discussing the Court’s history, how it operates, 
and how it has affected the international criminal law community.  Chapter 
five considers how well the Netherlands fulfilled its obligations as both host 
state and UN member state with regard to the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the former Yugoslavia, and Chapter seven uses the Special Court for 
Sierra Leone to discuss the practical aspects, such as budgeting and financing, 
of international judicial administration. 
The authority of international organizations and judicial bodies is also 
considered multiple times.  Chapter two, for example, gives a detailed account 
of a case in which the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia sought legal remedies 
in the International Court of Justice against the NATO countries for 
interfering in the ethnic conflict in Kosovo.  That case was ultimately 
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, with the various judges giving sharply 
divergent reasons for the unanimous outcome.  Chapter nine takes a broader 
look at how international judgments and opinions influence court proceedings 
at the national level. 
This book is highly recommended for academic law libraries looking 
to expand their international law collections, particularly those looking to 
grow their collection of theoretical works on international bodies.  It is not a 
beginner’s treatise and will have most use for professors and perhaps 
practitioners working in international law at a high level.  It should also be 
noted that, in spite of its title, this book would not be a significant addition to 
a Dutch law collection.  Although multiple Dutch cases are summarized and 
discussed, the focus is on the international aspects of the cases and the fact 
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Italian Private Law. (University of Texas at Austin Studies in Foreign and 
Transnational Law series.) By Guido Alpa and Vincenzo Zeno-Zencovich. 
Abingdon, New York: Routledge-Cavendish, 2007. Pp. xviii, 291. ISBN  978-
1-84472-051-4. US$120.00. 
 
 The University of Texas at Austin Studies in Foreign and 
Transnational Law is a new series.  The general editors are Sir Basil 
Markesinis and Dr. Jörg Fedtke, both legal academics resident in the United 
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Kingdom, but who are regular visitors at the University of Texas School of 
Law.  Titles that have so far appeared in the series are The French Civil Code 
(2006), Judicial Recourse to Foreign Law: A New Source of Inspiration? 
(2006), International Negotiation in the Twenty-first Century (2007), and 
Human Rights and the Private Sphere: A Comparative Study (2007).  Clearly, 
the series has an eclectic scope. 
 Italian Private Law is the other 2007 title in the series.  The authors 
are distinguished legal academics in Italy.  The foreword, written by one of 
the general editors, declares that the book is “perhaps the only general 
introduction to Italian private and commercial law currently available in the 
English language.”  Perhaps, unless one goes back to 2002, which is when 
Introduction to Italian Law appeared in the Kluwer series of introductions. 
 Chapter I, “Introductory Concepts,” is written at a high level of 
abstraction, but it contains several nuggets of good information.  For example, 
the chapter mentions the phenomenon of “decodification,” “a new phase in 
the civil law, in which the dominant tendency is away from gathering together 
all regulation of private relations in a single text and towards developing 
specific rules … in derogation from the general rules.”  There also is the 
discussion of the controversial question whether constitutional norms might 
apply to private relations.  This is rejected by the “traditional view,” but 
“modern scholarship has opened the door to such a possibility.” 
 Chapter II, innocuously titled “Natural Persons,” has some of the best 
information in the entire book.  The section on personality rights leads to the 
subsection on the right to life, which includes the subject of abortion.  There 
is a useful discussion of the statute, dating all the way back to 1978, that 
allows abortion in a liberal range of circumstances.  The legislation does have 
a trimester rule and a requirement of consultation.  Also mentioned is the 
early (1982) legislation allowing for legal change in the attribution of sex. 
 The section on personality rights also has a good treatment of the 
right to privacy.  The discussion of the protection of the intimate sphere is 
rather vague and does not mention the impact of the European Convention on 
Human Rights.  On the other hand, the treatment of data protection is 
stronger, dealing well with the 1996 legislation in the field that established a 
regulatory authority, though the entire discussion could have linked up with 
the requirements of EU law in this area.  A brief mention of the right to 
protection of one’s visual image leads into discussion of what is denominated 
the “right to personal identity,” which is akin to “false light” invasion of 
privacy in U.S. law.  Also noted is the specific, early (1970), and prescient 
legislation protecting workers from surveillance by technical devices. 
 Chapter III, “The Family and Succession,” has good coverage of the 
essentials, but no discussion of civil partnerships for either hetero- or 
homosexual couples.  Most likely, the book went to press before the (failed) 
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projects of the now-defunct Prodi government were presented.  Chapter IV, 
“Intermediate Communities,” as the title indicates, returns to a high level of 
generality, and is essentially taxonomical.  Chapter V, “Business and 
Companies,” also general and taxonomical, does have a useful section on 
types of undertakings.  The taxonomy works off two main categories: 
undertakings based on persons and undertakings based on capital.  Two 
paragraphs on winding up conclude the chapter, but the book appears to have 
gone to press too early to take account of such recent developments in the 
insolvency regime as the debt-restructuring agreement or the composition 
with creditors. 
 Chapter VI, “Property and Goods,” is again a general overview.  
Chapter VII, “Transactions and Contracts,” takes in a huge swath of legal 
territory, including an overview of the entire law of contracts, and succeeds 
rather well.  The necessary companion chapter on the other “half” of the law 
of obligations is chapter VIII, “Wrongful Acts and Civil Liability.”  Early in 
the chapter the reader finds the sentence, “Case law has clarified the meaning 
of fault.”  This is a defect that runs throughout the book:  constant reference to 
the case law without any citation to cases.  If case law has been so critical to 
the development of Italian law, then surely the authors could have found room 
to cite representative examples of giurisprudenza costante. The chapter makes 
a distinction between tort law systems, but using the unhelpful terminology 
“standard” and “non-standard.”  A non-standard system (e.g., Italy or France) 
applies a general liability clause, such as article 2043 of the Italian civil code.  
A standard system (e.g., Germany) goes on to specify interests to be protected 
by the liability rule.  The text then declares the distinction to be rather 
“mechanistic” because there has been a broadening and generalizing of the 
scope of redressable harm in standard systems, while in non-standard systems 
case law (again, no citations) has made a selection among interests.  “Thus, 
the two models tend to converge.”  This is not meant to be a criticism.  On the 
contrary, here is an example of sound comparative approach to the description 
of legal systems. The book closes on chapter IX, “Protection of Rights.”  This 
is an all-too-brief summary of civil procedure. 
 Extended monographs on national private law written for a foreign 
audience are rare.  Law libraries that collect foreign and comparative law will 
want to acquire all such works that appear, including this one. 
 
Jonathan Pratter 
International & Foreign Law Librarian 
Jamail Center for Legal Research 
Tarlton Law Library 
University of Texas School of Law 
Austin, TX USA 





The Fundamental Rules of the International Legal Order. Edited by 
Christian Tomuschat & Jean-Marc Thouvenin. Leiden; Boston: Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 2006. Pp. ix, 471. ISBN 90-04-149813. €125.00; 
US$169.00. 
 
 As is so often the case, the subtitle of this book is more accurate than 
the title.  After seeing the subtitle, the reader knows that a better title would 
be: Two Categories of Fundamental Norms of the International Legal Order. 
 In 2004, members of the Société Française pour le Droit 
International and the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Völkerrecht met at the 
Humboldt University in Berlin.  It was the fifth joint workshop of the two 
national societies of international law.  The papers delivered at the workshop 
are collected in this volume.  The French contributions have remained in 
French, while the German contributions have been rewritten in English.  The 
editors are former presidents of the two national societies of international law. 
 Probably intentionally, although this phenomenon is not mentioned in 
the foreword, several chapters run in pairs.  The book opens with two 
overview chapters, followed by a pair of chapters on the jus cogens aspects of 
the status of prisoners of war.  In light of our present circumstances, these 
chapters have particular topicality.  There follows a single chapter on jus 
cogens and the law of treaties, which, after all, is the birthplace of the 
concept.  Then comes a pair of chapters on the duty of non-recognition of a 
situation created by a breach of a jus cogens norm.  A single chapter on 
reparations for international crimes is followed by a pair of chapters on state 
immunity.  Then come single chapters on the immunity of senior state officers 
and on the right of third states to take countermeasures, a central element in 
the concept of erga omnes obligations.  These are followed by a pair of 
chapters on the possibility that the ICJ should have a special jurisdiction, 
independent of state consent, to take up cases involving the violation of 
fundamental norms.  Then the reader encounters a full four chapters devoted 
to universal jurisdiction, two coming at the concept from the criminal side, 
and two from the civil side (e.g., the U.S. Alien Tort Claims Act).  The book 
closes with two chapters of concluding remarks, one in French and one in 
English. 
 As the reader would expect, the quality of the contributions is 
uniformly high.  The pairing (and even quadrupling) of chapters on the same 
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coherence that prevents it from being a mere miscellany.  This book belongs 
in any substantial collection of general public international law. 
 
Jonathan Pratter 
International & Foreign Law Librarian 
Jamail Center for Legal Research 
Tarlton Law Library 
University of Texas School of Law 




A Foucauldian Approach to International Law: Descriptive Thoughts for 
Normative Issues. By Leonard M. Hammer. Aldershot; Burlington, Vt.: 
Ashgate, 2007. Pp. vi, 154. ISBN 13: 0-7546-2356-4. £55.00; US$99.95. 
 
Michel Foucault, one of the modern era’s most original academic 
philosophers, died nearly a quarter-century ago.  One doubts whether he 
foresaw that his surname would become adjectivalized, then pressed into 
service by his followers.  There are many books by scholars who claim to 
employ the master’s methods, and we readers may peruse Foucauldian 
approaches to everything from pedagogy to biometry.  Or are 
these…Foucaultian approaches?  Or Foucaldian approaches?  Or even – 
hideously – “Foucauian” ones?  It’s tempting to blame lazy translators for the 
lack of agreement on the name of this new philosophical tendency, but a 
glance at similar phrasing in French isn’t very instructive either.  For instance, 
how should we render une démarche foucaldienne in English?  Or le modèle 
foucaultien?  With such basics of nomenclature unresolved, can there be hope 
for the scholarship itself?  Happily, Leonard M. Hammer, a lecturer at Israel’s 
Zefat Academic College, hasn’t allowed such niceties to intrude upon his own 
inquiries, which center on how some of Foucault’s approaches might guide us 
in better resolving international disputes.    
International law is essentially a State-State affair; it rests on the 
notion of State sovereignty, and thus has evolved very little in its 
fundamentals since the era of Jean Bodin and Hugo Grotius.  Dr. Hammer 
explains the dichotomy prevailing in international public law, where positivist 
(descriptive) and normative (prescriptive) perspectives vie for influence.  He 
notes that, so long as the State is the fundamental unit of international 
relations, it will try to assert its will in any circumstance notionally governed 
by international law, and will seek to make the law binding on other actors to 
their detriment.  Against this State-centric Realpolitik there has arisen a more 
consensual and legitimist approach.  This approach is based on natural law, 
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which assumes a moral order to the universe.  It is no longer explicitly 
religious, but even in its secular guise speaks the language of an objectively 
discernible ethics that ought to inform conduct among international actors, 
State and non-State.  At its worst, this approach is dismissed as hopelessly 
utopian.  It is Dr. Hammer’s aim to try to break the impasse by applying 
Foucault’s concept of power – diffuse, dynamic, non-hierarchical, and not 
exclusively a function of State sovereignty – to specific types of international 
law problems.  He wishes to apply Foucault’s techniques on a small scale and 
to practical effect, and is not concerned with trying to devise a new theory of 
international law.  This is fitting because Foucault himself disdained les 
narratifs maîtres and most other attempts at knowledge codification in the 
social sciences. 
The book is structured such that its chapters deal with discrete areas 
of international public policy: the bases of international legal theory, the 
recognition of newly independent States, customary international law as a 
modulator of inter-State relations, freedom of religion or belief, and human 
security.  In each case, Dr. Hammer points out that a description of the 
problem, and a sense of understanding the how’s and why’s, are more 
important than trying to establish a new norm; Foucault, he reminds us, was 
above all an ardent describer of social phenomena.  Thus, in the chapter on 
recognition, Dr. Hammer tries to assess how a State acquires standing within 
the international system.  He concludes that an understanding of the processes 
underlying the acquisition of State personality might lead to a better 
understanding of the relational power fluxes operative in the system as a 
whole. 
The chapter dealing with belief may be the book’s focal point.  Dr. 
Hammer situates individual belief within the community, and stresses that 
Foucault saw the individual and society as exerting reciprocal influences.  Dr. 
Hammer sees in this continuous discourse a means to surmount cliché-ridden 
“individual versus the State” thinking, which Foucault argued was 
unempirical anyway.  For Foucault, the State was in society rather than above 
it, and State power just one power expression among many – a 
(depersonalized) spoke in the wheel.  Similarly, there is no attempt to 
privilege individual liberty.  Freedom of belief, then, shouldn’t be seen as 
being sited in an individual conscience that somehow operates outside the 
social nexus. 
This is a compelling argument, and Dr. Hammer echoes Foucault’s 
position that truth itself is an empty category; such truths as exist are purely 
contingent.  But it’s also possible that Dr. Hammer refracts Foucault more 
than he reflects him.  For instance, what if the State and its representatives 
don’t care to engage in continuous discourse with individual social actors or 
with social groups that the State doesn’t favor?  And what if the State has a 
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highly developed normative sense – indeed, doesn’t agree at all that truth is 
contingent – and attempts to impose its norms on a recalcitrant populace 
irrespective of accepted international practice, multilateral treaties, or U.N. 
declarations? 
Dr. Hammer has written and lectured widely on Foucault and 
international law, and his bibliography reflects extensive consultation of 
books, learned journals, and cases.  He is also an international lawyer who has 
rounded out his academic work with a professional practice.  Foucault was 
similarly unafraid to soil his hands; it is to his credit that he spent his time 
reviewing documents in archives rather than surveying his scholarly demesne 
from the comfort of the university club.  Foucault did not, like so many of his 
contemporaries, withdraw from the world, only to become drunk on his own 
imaginings.  Another of Foucault’s strengths as an academic was that he 
conveyed his findings clearly; the reader can almost literally see what 
Foucault was writing about.  Unfortunately, Dr. Hammer’s writing is dreary, 
and it’s difficult to follow his often circuitous arguments and understand their 
relevance.  And although the book is quite brief, the manuscript could have 
done with a good flensing, such is its wordiness.  Moreover, Dr. Hammer was 
failed by his copy editors, who couldn’t catch and correct a variety of grade-
school solecisms, or even decide on a consistent spelling – British or 
American – throughout.   
 And what of the very topicality of this book?  Do Foucault and his 
scholarship really yield anything useful about international law and inter-State 
relations?  Foucault’s books, course notes, and essays reveal that he had no 
special interest in the law, and in fact saw the law as a discipline in decline.  
And despite his belief that power is not necessarily the possession of the few 
and that power’s microprocesses should be the focal point of its study, his 
own conduct as a political actor belied those beliefs. 
In September and November 1978, Foucault visited Iran, then in 
incipient rebellion against Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi.  The Milanese 
broadsheet Corriere della Sera commissioned seven articles from him, and he 
also wrote on Iran for the Parisian weekly Le Nouvel Observateur.  Between 
those trips, in October 1978, he met Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, then 
residing in France.  Foucault was greatly interested in Iran’s revolutionary 
moment, seeing in its Islamic character and spontaneous exercise of popular 
power a counterweight to the Enlightenment’s oppressive rationality and 
universalist pretensions, and thereby offering hope to the Third World’s 
tyrannized masses – Muslim or not.  He seems to have accepted at face value 
the Khomeinist faction’s assertions that a revolutionary Iran would not 
become a theocracy.  This was evidently also the assurance expressed by 
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Mehdi Bazargan, prominent leader of a national human rights organization, 
whom Foucault also met that fall.10 
By the spring of 1979 the Shah had been put to flight and the 
revolution was consolidating under Ayatollah Khomeini and his followers.  
Nationalist and secular forces, ranging from liberals to communists, had been 
swept aside and the new Islamic regime was acting with impunity against all 
enemies, actual and potential.  Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, intimately involved 
in establishing the Islamic Republic, would later attempt to justify the 
regime’s harshness: “We are not like Allende and Mosaddeq – liberals 
waiting to be extinguished by the C.I.A.”11 
Foucault became defensive of his earlier enthusiasm for a 
revolutionary Iran and increasingly troubled by the new regime’s extremism, 
which included imprisoning opposition figures without charge, show trials, 
and public executions.  In April 1979 Foucault wrote an open letter to Dr. 
Bazargan, now the Islamic Republic’s prime minister, in Le Nouvel 
Observateur.12  The letter is remarkable for its appeal for human rights and 
due process, hardly what one might have expected from a man whose long 
academic career had consisted of decentering the individual and 
delegitimizing key social institutions.  Foucault also cast his arguments in the 
language of a universal humanism rooted in the Enlightenment, surprising 
given his skepticism of the very notion of universalism.  And the letter is 
noteworthy for its assuaging tone; after all, Foucault’s personal politics did 
not seem to be a politics of conciliation. 
For all Foucault’s emphasis on transgression and on discounting the 
importance of State power, he chose to address revolutionary Iran’s prime 
minister, evidently and at least for the purposes of his appeal, believing State 
power decisive, as well as vested in a national office holder.  He also seems to 
have been referencing a set of norms, apparently believing the contingency of 
truth to be – even if under restricted circumstances – itself contingent. 
In contrast to Foucault, German philosopher Jürgen Habermas has been 
genuinely engaged in applying social knowledge to political effect.  
Moreover, he has had a sincere interest in the law.  His book Between Facts 
and Norms13 lucidly set forth his research and observations on deliberative 
                                                 
10 For background, see especially the article “Foucault et l’Iran : à propos du 
désir de révolution” by L. Olivier and S. Labbé in the Revue canadienne de science 
politique of June 1991. 
11 Varying translations of this remark can be found in the literature.  See e.g. at p. 
111 of Khomeinism: Essays on the Islamic Republic.  Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1993. 
12 “Lettre ouverte à Mehdi Bazargan” in issue 753 of April 14, 1979.  
13 Published originally as Faktizität und Geltung.  Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp 
Verlag, 1992. 
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politics, and is in certain respects relevant to some of the themes Dr. Hammer 
has identified.  Perhaps another scholar might one day write a book 
incorporating une approche habermasienne to international law. 
 
*Scott Rasmussen 




Multiple Nationality and International Law (Developments in International 
Law). By Alfred M. Boll. Leiden; Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2007.  
Pp. xv, 626. ISBN 90-04-14838-8. €149.00; US$201.00. 
 
In 1943, the author’s grandparents lost their German nationality when 
they fled to avoid Nazi persecution as a mixed Jewish/non-Jewish couple. 
They obtained American nationality. Article 116 of the German Basic Law 
permits former Germans and their descendants who were deprived of their 
nationality by Nazi laws to obtain reinstatement as German nationals upon 
request. The author brought suit in Berlin administrative court to regain his 
German nationality. In 1996, the Oberverwaltungsgericht Berlin (Berlin court 
of administrative appeals) held that because Boll’s grandparents had obtained 
American nationality of their own “free will,” Boll was not entitled to dual 
German-American nationality.14 In this case, Germany’s commitment to 
atoning for Nazi human rights violations gave way to its preference for 
avoiding multiple nationality.  
Boll served as Legal Adviser, Representative, and Delegate of the 
International Committee of the Red Cross for ten years. In 2003, he joined the 
U.S. State Department. Perhaps spurred by his experience with German law, 
Boll has written a comprehensive study of multiple nationality in international 
law. He bases his survey on a detailed study of the state practice of 45 
countries, selected to provide meaningful diversity. He summarizes the 
practice of these 45 countries, along with an additional 30, in the book’s 
Appendix, which accounts for half the book.  
This Appendix alone justifies the cost of the book. For each country, 
Boll identifies the relevant legislation, much of which he obtained from the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees website.15 Researchers will 
                                                 
* Mr. Rasmussen is a legal editor and translator. 
14 Urteil vom 4. April 1996 – OVG 5 B 60.93 (Land Berlin gegen Alfred M. 
Boll) (unpublished decision). 
15 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Refworld, 
http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/refworld/rwmain (see under “Legal 
Information”). 
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be grateful that Boll has not restricted his work to the more accessible 
Western European or English-speaking countries; his survey includes states 
such as Egypt, Fiji, Turkey, Indonesia, Romania, and Syria. (Boll himself says 
in passing that “most reviews of municipal legislation on nationality 
encompass European, North American and a few other developed states.”)  
Fortunately, Boll works in Dutch, German, Indonesian, Portugese, and 
Spanish, among other languages, and sprinkles his abundant footnotes with 
translated quotations.  
In the Appendix, Boll presents a template for each country,16 noting 
first whether the country makes distinctions between various categories of 
nationality, or between nationality and citizenship. He then lists events that 
may trigger acquisition of nationality, summarizing the relevant law, and 
specifies whether the acquisition is conditioned upon the loss or renunciation 
of another nationality. Next, he covers events that may lead to the withdrawal 
or loss of nationality, again summarizing the relevant law and stating whether 
the event may cause a loss of nationality. Finally, under “special 
considerations,” he describes the country’s general attitude toward multiple 
nationality, and then highlights provisions, if any, for recognition of multiple 
nationality.  
I should clarify, however, that Boll does not link his summaries of 
relevant law to specific legislative provisions. The first footnote under each 
country heading gives a laundry-list of applicable constitutional provisions, 
laws, and regulations. Boll’s summary of the law on acquiring nationality by 
birth, for example, does not include a footnote to the particular legal 
instrument that provides for this acquisition. While linking his summaries to 
specific laws would greatly benefit researchers, many of his conclusions must 
arise from considering the legal framework as a whole.  Thus, it is not 
surprising that he chose not to attempt to provide these links. 
Despite the detailed analysis of national legislation in so many 
countries, Boll cautions that his enquiry is not one of comparative law per se.  
His purpose in looking at various states’ practice is to discern general trends 
in state practice and draw conclusions about the effects of such practice in 
public international law.  These conclusions, and their groundwork, make up 
the rest of the book.  
In Chapter 1, Boll places multiple nationality in its legal context. He 
emphasizes a point that most of us have observed in our own lives: 
 
At least in terms of physical capacity, it is today possible to remain in 
touch with friends and family by various means of 
telecommunications, even to receive almost instantaneous news of 
                                                 
16 Boll sets forth the template at pp. 46-47. 
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events in remote places. This is true even of people of relatively 
modest economic means. Emigration once meant life-long separation 
due to physical and technological factors, whereas it arguably no 
longer does today.  
 
Boll observes that it is increasingly common for people to move 
between countries without necessarily wishing to abandon their country of 
origin, or assuming that leaving means never returning. While states remain 
the arbiters of nationality under international law, and have historically been 
neutral or hostile toward multiple nationality, Boll concludes that multiple 
nationality has become, in practice, the norm.    
Chapter 2 lays the groundwork by defining terms and separating 
concepts such as nationality and citizenship.  Boll draws on an impressive 
range of sources to construct clear and workable definitions. Chapter 3 
addresses the general topic of nationality in international law, including 
recognition, acquisition, consequences, and loss of nationality. This chapter 
also covers nationality in municipal law: distinctions between nationals and 
aliens, and the loyalties and obligations of nationals.  
In Chapter 4, Boll narrows his focus to the history and treatment of 
multiple nationality, including the influence of human rights. He summarizes 
arguments both for and against multiple nationality. Although Boll states 
repeatedly that his book is not intended to advocate for or against multiple 
nationality, his own experience seems to have honed his sensitivity to the 
human dimensions of the topic, leading him to favor multiple nationality. At 
various points in the text, he highlights certain acts that may result in 
automatic loss of nationality, e.g., a dual U.S./Australian national, required to 
vote by Australian law, but by such an act, losing her U.S. nationality.17 His 
discussion of the role of human rights in, for example, allowing women to 
retain their nationality upon marriage, and to transmit it to their children, 
suggests sympathy for the person with multiple allegiances.   
Chapter 5 begins with an outline of conclusions on the principles of 
international law that govern nationality, and on the areas of international law 
influenced by multiple nationality. While Boll concludes that multiple 
nationality has become a norm of state practice, he cautions that the principle 
as such has not become part of international law.  Nonetheless, his study 
disproves the claim that international law rejects multiple nationality.   
One of the many strengths of this work is Boll’s emphasis on 
nationality law as a nuanced field, in which the actual practice of states may 
diverge from the language of their rules. In a highly-favorable review of this 
                                                 
17 Boll  notes that the US provision in question is now inapplicable for most 
purposes.   
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book by Hans Ulrich Jessurun d’Oliveira, a Dutch legal scholar, however, the 
reviewer points to discrepancies between Dutch law as summarized by Boll 
and how it is applied on the ground.18 Thus, practitioners should remain alert 
to such divergence. 
The book includes an extensive, multilingual bibliography, including 
articles, books, treaties, and cases. Its index is thorough and accurate. This 
short review cannot do justice to the wealth of thought-provoking, careful 
analysis Boll has packed into his book. While immigration practitioners may 
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Introduction to Middle Eastern Law. By Chibli Mallat. Oxford; New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2007. Pp. xxvii, 455. ISBN1 978-0-19-923049-5. 
UK£60.00; US$110.00. 
 
The author, Chibli Mallat, is the former Director of the Centre of 
Islamic and Middle Eastern Law at the University of London, and currently 
works as a human rights lawyer, professor of Middle Eastern law and politics 
at the University of Utah, and professor of law at the Université Saint-Joseph 
in Beirut.  He is also a candidate for the presidency of Lebanon.  Professor 
Mallat has the requisite background to put together something as daunting as 
an introductory text on Middle Eastern law.   
Introduction to Middle Eastern Law covers the 4,000 year legal 
history of the region that consists of about twenty-five current states and 
stretches from the Atlantic Ocean to India.  The Table of Cases, Legislation, 
Verses, and Hadith at the beginning of the book gives an idea of the scope of 
the subject.  The case law cited ranges from the Nippur homicide trial in 
Mesopotamia, perhaps the first instance of a criminal law case report, to the 
2004 United States Supreme Court case of Rasul v. Bush.  Cited legislation 
includes the Code of Hammurabi, the Dead Sea Scrolls, and modern codes 
and constitutions of the Middle East, Europe, and the United States.  Citations 
to the Bible, Qur’an, and Hadith, the words and deeds of Mohammed, reflect 
                                                 
18 Hans Ulrich Jessurun d’Oliveira, Book Review, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 922, 926 
(2007). 
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the importance that religious law has played and continues to play in the 
region.  The author states that this is a book for lawyers rather than for 
philosophers or political scientists and that his objective is to identify the 
specific features of a legal family which can be coherently described as 
Middle Eastern.   
The book is divided into four main parts: legal history, public law, 
private law, and a brief conclusion.  The four parts are further divided into 
eleven chapters, with most of the chapters appearing in the parts on public and 
private law.  The first two chapters consider the nature and formation of 
Middle Eastern law. The author provides an overview of pre-Islamic law 
dating back 2,000 years before the Qur’an.  However, the focus is on Islamic 
law and its early scholars and schools.  Indeed, the focus of the entire book is 
on Islamic law.  The author postulates that Islamic law is central to Middle 
Eastern law.  
There are four chapters devoted to public law.  The first offers a brief 
legal history of the contemporary Middle East. The author writes that the 
modern Middle East began in 1798 with the occupation of Egypt by 
Napoleon’s troops.  This was the beginning of Western colonialism and with 
that the age of codification.  A number of codes are studied in detail later in 
the book.  There are two chapters devoted to constitutional law.  The first 
focuses on the French model of analysis, looking at political institutions, the 
election process, and separation of powers.  The next follows the American 
model of analysis, examining the state of judicial review and case law in the 
Middle East.  In the final chapter on public law the author looks at the rule of 
law and the operation of the courts.  He notes the numerous problems the 
courts face in maintaining the rule of law such as the lack of systematic and 
reliable reporting and the undermining of judges by the executive branch.   
There are four chapters devoted to private law.  The author begins 
with a brief history of codes and the reception of civil law in the Middle East.  
The civil code, he notes, is at the heart of the legal system and even countries 
which were under British domination “did not squarely espouse the case-law 
format.”  The next chapter covers the development of modern codes in the 
Middle East with an emphasis on the Majalla, the nineteenth century Ottoman 
Civil Code, and the twentieth century Egyptian Civil Code, drafted under the 
guidance of ‘Abd al-Razzaq al-Sanhuri.  The author traces the development of 
contract law and tort law from the classical period to their current state as 
represented in the Sanhuri Code.  The next chapter looks at commercial law in 
the Middle East, a field now dominated by Western principles.  The author 
presents a series of case summaries from various modern jurisdictions 
intended to illustrate the influence of Western commercial law in the Middle 
East.   
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The final private law chapter deals with family law.  This is a 
dynamic area of law in the region because, the author writes, “It is in fact 
mostly in family disputes that clashes with Islamic law rules are encountered 
in court.”  Professor Mallat begins the chapter on family law with a quote 
from Alexis de Tocqueville about the gradual development of the principle of 
equality.19  That is the theme of this chapter.  The author notes that modern 
legislation favors gender equality and that the egalitarian trend is the norm.  
As evidence of this trend he presents the Unified Arab Code of Personal 
Status, a restatement of family law carried out by the Arab ministries of 
justice in the 1970s and 1980s.  To show that there may be some room for 
improvement, the author includes criticism of the Code by two women: one 
an Egyptian lawyer and the other an Iraqi author.   
This book is noteworthy for several reasons.  First, the scope of the 
subject matter is uncommonly broad.  There are numerous publications on 
Middle Eastern religious law, family law, and commercial law.  There are 
even a few introductory legal texts on individual countries in the region.  
However, a general introductory text on Middle Eastern law, in English, is 
rare.  Second, many of the chapters were previously published, in part or in 
totality, as journal articles or book chapters.  Therefore, the pages are more 
heavily footnoted than a standard introductory work.  The book contains a 
twenty-three page bibliography of resources that have been cited in the text.  
Finally, perhaps the most distinguishing feature of the book is that the author 
does not hesitate to interject his opinions on Middle Eastern law and society.  
Professor Mallat writes that he would not be comfortable describing any of 
the Middle Eastern jurisdictions as “a state where the rule of law prevails, or 
as a democratic country.” He attributes the failure of the courts to pressure 
from other branches of government, military rule, and Muslim extremists.  In 
addition, he calls Middle Eastern legal education “depressing,” the bar “a 
hotbed of frustrated lawyers,” and the region’s legal publications 
“unreadable.”  This is not merely a descriptive text on Middle Eastern law 
written by an uninterested observer. 
Those who want some personality and a point of view with their law 





                                                 
19 The quote, from de Tocqueville’s Democracy in America, reads, “The gradual 
development of the principle of equality is, therefore, a providential fact. It has all the 
chief characteristics of such a fact: it is universal, it is lasting, it constantly eludes all 
human interference, and all events as well as all men contribute to its progress.”   





book, it would perhaps be difficult to find a text on the topic that does not 
come with a few opinions. 
 
John Schroeder 
Foreign and International Reference Librarian 
University of the Pacific 
McGeorge School of Law 




Legal Research Methods in the U.S. and Europe.  By J. Paul Lomio and 
Henrik Spang-Hanssen. Copenhagen, Denmark: DJØF Publishing, 2008.  Pp 
329. ISBN 978-87-574-1715-9 US$34.95. 
 
The practice of law is increasingly globalizing, which underscores the 
need for lawyers to be well versed with conducting research in legal systems 
around the world.  As the world economy becomes more integrated, this 
process will continue as disputes arise and are resolved through a combination 
of national and international law.  Already, rigid distinctions are breaking 
down as international tribunals deal with domestic claims ranging from the 
designation of an ecological park in Mexico, to a Mississippi judge’s conduct 
in a jury trial, to the denial of Value Added Tax refunds in the Ecuadorian oil 
sector.20  Legal education is likewise changing to meet these new challenges.  
The first year of Harvard Law School’s curriculum was revised in 2007 to 
require a course on “global legal systems,” while Stanford Law School 
already has 12 joint degree programs on offer and is adding more annually. A 
critical portion of this legal education will involve students, and practitioners, 
learning how to conduct foundational legal research in unfamiliar common 
and civil law systems.   
Legal Research Methods in the U.S. and Europe is the first book that 
offers a comprehensive survey of transnational legal research methods, albeit 
focused on U.S. and European systems, and is meant to be equally helpful to 
                                                 
20 SD Myers, Inc. v. Government of Canada (merits) (13 November 2000), 40 
ILM 1408, 15(1) World Trade and Arb Mat 184; Metalclad Corporation v.  United 
Mexican States (Merits) (30 August 2000), 16 ICSID Rev 168, 40 ILM 36, 5 ICSID 
Rep 212, 13(1) World Trade and Arb Mat 45; Loewen Group, Inc. and Raymond L.  
Loewen v.  United States of America (Merits) (26 June 2003), 42 ILM 811, 7 ICSID 
Rep 442, 15(5) World Trade and Arb Mat 97.   
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common law lawyers and civil law attorneys (“jurists”).  The purpose of the 
book is to introduce U.S. legal research to Europeans, and European legal 
research to Americans, in an effort to create a common foundation for 
transatlantic collaboration.  The book consists of an introduction and six 
chapters.  The chapters break down as follows: chapter 2 is a practical guide 
for foreign lawyers conducting legal research in the U.S.; chapter 3 focuses on 
European and the civil law; chapter 4 lays out resources for researching 
European Union (E.U.) law; chapter 5’s topic is public international law; and 
chapters 6 and 7 analyze comparative law research methods.  The book 
attempts to bridge legal cultures from the first page, just as the European 
Court of Justice does in combining civil and common law traditions, showing 
areas of common ground and also enumerating areas in which unique legal 
research tools are required.  For instance, the authors note that many 
Europeans criticize U.S. legal research because of the significant amount of 
time spent on unraveling the case law on a particular subject.  This viewpoint 
is based on a misconception about the fundamental importance of case law to 
the U.S. system.  In this way, the book is couched in the particular social 
contexts of each nation and legal system surveyed, providing a thorough and 
culturally sensitive account of legal research methods.   
The book abounds with many useful asides regarding the similarities 
and differences of common and civil law, which is useful to scholars and 
practitioners alike on both sides of the Atlantic.  The prolific use of pin-cited 
footnotes, as an example, is the bane of many European authors who are used 
to much more scant documentation than is the norm in American legal 
scholarship.  Such a philosophy would be professional suicide for American 
legal scholars.  At the same time, several nations are experiencing a 
convergence of civil and common law, such as in the U.K. where statutes are 
becoming more prevalent and are trumping longstanding common law 
principles, whereas there is now a greater use of precedent on the continent 
than has historically been the case.  Indeed, much common ground is shared 
in the structure of U.S. and E.U. law.  The U.S. federal legal system, being 
comprised of a central government and 50 distinct legal entities, resonates 
with the E.U. experience.  Nevertheless, significant differences also exist, 
which Lomio and Spang-Hanssen unravel in turn.  The most significant areas 
that will be focused on herein include: (a) the commonalities and differences 
between the civil and common law experience; (b) a review of practical 
research guides included in the text; and (c) specific civil law differences 
relating to statutes, case law, and secondary sources.  The focus of this review 
will be on chapters 3-7.  The topic of chapter 2 is legal research in the U.S., 
offering a broad-based introduction to U.S. law from the composition and 
passage of state laws to the wide array of secondary sources available to guide 
research efforts.  This review, though, is meant primarily for a U.S. (or 
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common law) audience wishing to research civil law in Europe and beyond, 
which is the subject of the latter chapters. 
Chapters 3-7 of the book offer a tremendous amount of information 
useful to foreign lawyers researching in European legal systems.  This 
introduction to civil law is critical for international attorneys, given that civil 
law is the dominant legal tradition in not only Europe, but also Central and 
South America, most of Asia and Africa, and even such diverse places as 
Scotland, Louisiana, Quebec, and Puerto Rico.  All of these regions sport 
rules, institutions, procedures, and traditions largely alien to a common law 
trained lawyer.  Distinctions may also be made among groups of common and 
civil law nations – neither branch of law is monolithic.  The Code Civile of 
France’s philosophy of breaking with the monarchy is in marked contrast with 
the German Civil Code’s attempt to codify existing law, while the U.S. 
codifies law and has a written constitution, unlike the U.K.  The common 
thread in the civil law context is that stare decisis, the foundation of common 
law jurisprudence, is not sacrosanct.  Instead, legislators enact statutes, 
scholars give them meaning, and judges apply results.  Jurists consult with 
both sources in formulating their arguments, the goal being to interpret 
statutory texts so as to conceptually fit them into the overall system.  Given 
this fact, legal researchers approaching a civil law matter must undertake their 
investigation in a far different manner from which is common in the U.S. or 
other common law jurisdictions.  To underscore these differences, the authors 
lay out a guide for researchers.   
The natural starting point of a civil law investigation is so-called 
“hard law.”  This includes sources such as constitutional articles, then acts, 
codes or statutes, then examining intent (strict constructionism is not a force 
in European jurisprudence) through the legislative history and white papers.  
Next, legal researchers should look to administrative judicial precepts, such as 
regulations or government orders, and only then research cases, which are 
broken down into “soft law” including (a) court decisions and (b) decisions by 
an administrative authority.  The history of each case must then be scrutinized 
to see if it has any precedential value – though some states, such as Denmark, 
give greater weight to precedent than others, such as Spain.  If any conflicts 
exist, they should first and foremost be resolved through applying the lex 
superior principle, which states that hierarchy must be respected, i.e., the 
legal rules adopted by lower bodies must comply with statutes and other 
higher-order rules.  Only then may the “legal meaning” of the statute be 
concluded with any degree of confidence.  If time is of the essence, the 
authors advise a hurried advocate to research the applicable “hard law,” and 
forego the soft law precedents.  Drilling down on the fundamentals, the 
authors, primarily Spang-Hanssen in chapters 3-7, starting at a macro level, 
next consider statues, cases, and secondary sources.  
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European legal systems are interconnected to a degree that may be 
familiar to U.S.-trained lawyers in considering interlocking federal and state 
systems.  Chapter 4 offers many useful comparisons between the E.U. and 
U.S. federal systems, the main difference being that E.U. nations maintain full 
sovereignty in a greater range of matters, e.g., there is no European version of 
the dormant commerce clause.  Detailed explanations are also offered for the 
different spheres of power of in the E.U., e.g., the European Commission and 
Council.  Basic search strategies for these institutions are provided, such as a 
website containing all of the basic legal texts on which the E.U. and European 
Communities are founded.  In this manner, the book offers a firm grounding 
on the continental and European-wide court systems.  At a macro level, 
though, civil law nations are setup fundamentally differently from common 
law countries.  The separation of powers takes on an entirely different 
meaning in Europe than it has in the U.S.  Moreover, civil law is a creature of 
parliament, not the “government.”  “Public” and “private” law distinctions 
also have a far different connotation in the U.S. and Europe.  Private law is 
conceived far more narrowly in Europe and is distinguished from commercial 
law in many nations (excluding Switzerland and Italy).  That is not where the 
differences end. 
The authors note that even the composition of statutes, acts, and 
codes, all areas in which civil and common law systems would seem to have 
the most in common, differ greatly.  In civil law countries, acts are authored 
by parliament, ordinances by government, and regulations by agencies.21  
Further, European statutes are not structured like their U.S. equivalents, nor 
are they compiled as is the practice with the U.S. Code.  No specific hierarchy 
exists in statutory construction, from title, to chapter, section, and paragraph.  
Many of these terms in the E.U. are interchangeable, even the symbol “§,” 
well-known to American legal scholars as signifying “section,” can be used to 
indicate paragraph, section, or an entire statute in Europe.  As one would 
surmise, this is the result of the fact that there is no common European 
citation system, though the Guide to Foreign and International Legal Citation, 
published by N.Y.U. Law School, is offered as a helpful guide and is 
available for free download. 
Beyond statutes, myriad practical distinctions exist between the U.S. 
and European benches, such as the fact that all European judges are appointed 
for life, like the U.S. federal judiciary.  None are elected.  Another point of 
                                                 
21 It should be noted that the term “government” has very different meanings in 
civil and common law countries.  The key distinction is that in the U.S., 
“government” may refer an amorphous combination of the Executive, Legislative, 
and Judicial branches, whereas in Europe “government” is commonly used solely in 
reference to the Executive. 
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distinction that would confuse American and European researchers alike is the 
practice of writing dissenting and concurring opinions.  This practice is far 
less common in Europe than it is in the U.S., potentially because cases 
generally have far less importance as “law” in the civil law context.  This also 
means that European case decisions are difficult to come by.  Few are 
available online, and those that are, are posted only in the official language of 
the court’s host state.  Widespread access to Lexis and WestLaw is far less 
common on the continent, with most law schools only have a single, shared 
account.  Similarly, law reviews are not managed or edited by students in the 
E.U. as they are in the U.S.  Nor are they affiliated with a single university, 
instead being regional publications with boards consisting of professor, 
judges, and other legal experts.  Articles are shorter, are rarely available 
electronically (compared to the U.S. in which some newer law reviews are 
published exclusively online), and do not have the same precedential weight 
across Europe. 
Despite its many triumphs, there still exists opportunities for revision 
in the next edition of Legal Research Methods in the U.S. and Europe.  
Organizationally it would benefit the reader to have a well-developed 
introduction at the beginning of each chapter laying out the goals of the 
chapter and providing some structure for the different issues that will be 
addressed.  This would be especially helpful in chapter 4 on European Union 
resources, since it covers such a wide range of information.  In this process, 
the authors should also distill down information to its core, editing such 
passages as the five page quotation from Corpus Juris Secundum beginning 
on p.142.  In this vein, a greater use of diagrams and checklists, such as which 
appears on p.116 and p.127, would also be useful throughout chapters 3-7 to 
aid the reader.  These are more common in chapter 2, and provide for an easy 
comprehension of, at times, difficult conceptual terrain at a glance.  Strategies 
for researchers are similarly included, but are embedded in the text.  These 
should be highlighted.  Chapters 3-7 could also benefit from a greater use of 
examples, and precise directions on how to locate civil law statutes, 
explanatory white papers, and other secondary interpretive sources.  Examples 
of principles could also be provided. What are the jus cogens and erga omnes 
norms?  Other minor inconsistencies among the chapters should also be 
addressed.  For example, why would civil law be “the law of professors” if in 
fact government ministers draft legislation without consultation with legal 
scholars, and the white papers that are published are from panels appointed by 
the ministers themselves?  And how can Portugal be categorized as a 
Romanistic as well as a Germanic nation?  What significance does this have 
in researching Portuguese civil law? 
On a related point, the sections on legal families and comparative law 
should be revised.  Legal unity began to break down in Europe in the 
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eighteenth century as national codes were put in place of Roman law.  As a 
result, distinct legal groupings have been created across Europe.  The authors 
deconstruct these groupings usefully into the following continental European 
families, including: the Romanistic family (France, the Benelux countries, 
Italy, Spain, and Portugal), the Germanic family (Germany, Austria, Croatia, 
Switzerland, Greece, and Portugal), the Anglo-American family (England, 
Wales, Northern Ireland, Ireland, Scotland, the U.S., Australia, New Zealand, 
and Canada (excluding Quebec)), and the Nordic family (Denmark, Finland, 
Iceland, Norway, and Sweden).  This listing is offered in chapter 3, and is 
replicated in chapter 6 with the addition of “the law in the far east” (China, 
Japan), and the vaguely named “religions legal systems” (Islamic and Hindu 
Law).  These groupings are duplicative, and should be folded together in 
chapter 6 (itself only 5 pages), which should then be expanded to contain a 
more thorough discussion of the heart of this book, comparative legal research 
(the subject of chapter 7).  In addition, although it would add to the length of 
the book, a brief synopsis of legal research methods in each civil law nation 
would be of great benefit to the researcher.  Namely, this could include a 
basic list of secondary sources, examples of statute and case citation.  In 
future editions, it would also be helpful to add a chapter on Asian, Latin 
American, and African legal research, potentially in a revised chapter 6. 
Minor typographical errors should also be addressed in the next 
edition, such as spacing on p.120, grammatical inconsistencies on p.97, and 
formatting concerns on p. 142.  The prose and style of the latter chapters can, 
at times, be disjointed.  This may distract the reader, and detract from full 
comprehension. The different philosophies undergirding citation methods in 
the U.S. and the E.U. is also easily apparent in the book.  Chapter 2 offers far 
more detailed, and formatted, citations than does chapter 4, which documents 
cited tables as coming from “E.U. websites, the same as all other tables in this 
chapter.”  Such discrepancies between the chapters should be ironed out in 
future editions, though they are instructive as to the divide in legal cultures 
that separates American and European legal cultures.  This also underscores 
the need to develop a distinct but commonly understood citation system to be 
used by American and European practitioners. 
 Legal Research Methods in the U.S. and Europe has broken new 
ground by offering a concise guide to transatlantic legal research in a single 
volume.  It is clear that as the practice of law globalizes, so too must legal 
education, specifically legal research methods.  Through offering an 
examination of legal research in the U.S. and Europe, Lomio and Spang-
Hanssen have opened the door for more literature in this vital area.  The law, 
and legal research, can no longer be considered in national or regional  
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isolation.  We live in an increasingly interdependent world requiring research 
techniques that span legal cultures as easily as data now spans continents. 
 
Scott Shackelford 
Stanford Law School 




From Human Rights to International Criminal Law: Studies in Honour of 
an African Jurist, the Late Judge Laïty Kama / Des droits de l’homme au 
droit international penal: Etudes en l’honneur d’un juriste african, feu le 
juge Laïty Kama. Edited by E. Decaux, A. Dieng, and M. Sow. Leiden; 
Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2007. Pp. vii, 774. ISBN: 
9789004160552. €175.00; US$245.00. 
 
The untimely death of Judge Laïty Kama in May of 2001 was a great 
loss to the international legal community. In a press release on the occasion of 
his passing, then Secretary General Kofi Annan eulogized Judge Kama thusly: 
Judge Kama was an eminent jurist who played a key role in the 
development of the judicial work of the Rwanda Tribunal. He has 
made historic contributions to international humanitarian law as 
former presiding judge of the Tribunal's first Trial Chamber that 
rendered judgements in the Akayesu case and the Kambanda case in 
1998. It will be recalled that the Akayesu case was the first ever 
judgement for the crime of genocide by an international court and was 
also the first ever judgement to convict an accused person of rape as a 
crime against humanity. Judge Kama's verdict in the Kambanda case 
(which involved the former Prime Minister of Rwanda) was the first 
ever conviction of a head of government for genocide.221 
Indeed, Judge Kama, who served as President of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) from 1995 to 1999 and later as 
Presiding Judge of the Tribunal's second Trial Chamber was instrumental in 
the creation and development of the Rwanda Tribunal in its formative years. 
As a jurist, he presided over several of the most significant decisions on 
international humanitarian law since the verdicts rendered at Nuremberg. In 
an effort to recognize his considerable jurisprudential contributions, the 
                                                 
22 Press Release, Secretary-General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan, 
Secretary-General Expresses Profound Sadness at Death of Judge Laity Kama, First 
President of Rwanda Criminal Tribunal (May 8, 2001) at 
http://www.unis.unvienna.org/unis/pressrels/2001/sgsm7794.html. 
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publication of this excellent collection of 30 new essays provides a fitting 
tribute to the jurist’s work. In addition, it also provides a panoptic survey of 
the development of procedural and substantive international criminal law in 
light of the contributions of the ad hoc tribunals and the International 
Criminal Court (ICC). 
This bilingual collection opens with two memorial essays by Louis 
Joinet, Cècile Aptel, and Mandiaye N. Niang, which offer a personal glimpse 
into the character of Judge Kama by his former colleagues. His jurisprudential 
legacy is next explored in the essay “Judge Laïty Kama: Five Cases to 
Develop International Criminal Law,” This essay examines a selection of the 
significant Trial Chamber judgments delivered by Kama as presiding judge 
that grappled with a number of substantive issues of international criminal 
law. For example, in the the Akayesu case, the body clarified the means rea 
requirement for acts constituting genocide.23 The Akayesu case represented 
the first opportunity for the Trial Chamber to apply the Genocide Convention 
as it was incorporated in article 2 of the ICTR statute.  The court also refined 
the analysis for determining whether a particular population constituted a 
“protected group” within the meaning of the Genocide Convention and the 
statute of the ICTR. The court made its determination by using a flexible 
standard that utilized both objective and subjective criteria.243The Akayesu 
judgement, as noted by Secretary General Anan, was also notable in that it 
was “the first time in the history of humanitarian law [that] the Chamber 
handed down a conviction for rape as a crime against humanity and held that 
the rapes condoned and encouraged by Akayesu constituted genocide.”254The 
court also clarified the definitions of various forms of criminal participation in 
the Tribunal’s statute and under what conditions defendants could be charged 
with concurrent crimes. Lastly, the tribunal addressed the issue of whether 
there is a hierarchy in the ICTR statute between the crimes of genocide, 
crimes against humanity, and war crimes. 
Judge Kama also participated in several decisions that provided 
important guidance to other ad hoc and permanent tribunals regarding due 
process issues relating to defendants before the court. For example, the 
Serushago265case examined how a trial chamber must go about verifying a 
                                                 
23 The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgement 
(TC1), 2 September 1998. 
24 Akayesu Judgement, para. 170 
25 Richard J. Goldstone & Estelle A. Dehon, Engendering Accountability: Gender 
Crimes Under International Criminal Law, 19 NEW ENG. J PUB. POL’Y 121 
(2003) 
26 The Prosecutor v. Omar Serushago, Case No. ICTR-98-39-S, Sentence (TC1), 
5 February 1999. 
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defendant’s guilty plea under the statute, while the Kambanda276and 
Rutaganda287cases looked at the methodology a Tribunal should employ to 
make sentencing determinations that balance the gravity of the crime with the 
individual’s responsibility. Taken together, the five cases outlined in the 
chapter provide a well-reasoned set of precedents for future tribunals while 
highlighting Judge Kama’s considerable skills as a jurist. 
In addition to re-examining the extensive jurisprudential legacy of 
Laïty Kama, From Human Rights to International Criminal Law also offers a 
substantial collection of scholarly studies that reflect a wide range of topics in 
the field of international criminal law, humanitarian law, international human 
rights, and African law. Not surprisingly, the substantive law of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda is examined with great care. 
Lennart Aspegren and James A. Williamson look at the case law of the 
Rawandan Tribunal regarding the crime of genocide, while Coline Rapneau 
offers a commentary on the Prosecutor v. Laurent Semanza case,29 which 
dealt with the issue of cumulative convictions, i.e., the ability to prosecute and 
convict an individual for multiple crimes based on a single act that violates 
more than one provision of criminal law. The Tribunal in Semanza, following 
the case law of previous ICTR and International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia (ICTY) decisions, found that in order to uphold multiple 
convictions for the same act, distinct elements between the various crimes 
must be present. However, Semanza added an additional wrinkle to the 
analysis by holding that in order for such a conviction to be viable, it “must be 
used only when necessary to draw a complete picture of the accused criminal 
conduct.”309Another extremely interesting and timely study included in the 
collection is Gert-Jan Alexander Knoops’ work on the Abu Graibh 
prosecutions from the perspective of the case law of the ICTY and the ICTR. 
Finally, Cyril Laucci completes the analysis of the work of the Rawandan 
Tribunal by looking at the issue of war crimes from the perspective of the 
Court’s jurisprudence. 
In addition to substantive law, the procedural law of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda is given particular emphasis. Jean-Pelé Fomété 
                                                 
27 The Prosecutor v. Jean Kambanda, Case No. ICTR-97-23-S, Judgement and 
Sentence (TC1), 4 September 1998. 
28 The Prosecutor v. Georges Anderson Nderubumwe Rutaganda, Case No. 
ICTR-96-3-T, Judgement and Sentence (TC1), 6 December 1999. 
29 Coline Rapneau, The Prosecutor v. Laurent Semanza, Case No. ICTR-97-20, 
Judgement, Trial Chamber (15 May 2003), in FROM HUMAN RIGHTS TO 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW : STUDIES IN HONOUR OF AN AFRICAN 
JURIST, THE LATE JUDGE LAÏTY KAMA 297, 309  (Emmanuel Decaux et al. 
eds., 2007) 
30 Id. 
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examines the “completion strategy” for the ICTR, which is the framework by 
which the tribunal is to wind up their investigative and prosecutorial work by 
2010 as mandated by the Security Council. The author takes a rare look at the 
measures the Court has taken to expedite proceedings and transfer remaining 
cases to Rawandan domestic jurisdiction for prosecution. Complementing 
Fomété’s article, authors Alhagi Marong, Chernor Jalloh, and David 
Kinnecome elaborate upon the question of concurrent jurisdiction by 
addressing the procedural impediments imposed upon the ICTR that make 
transferring cases to national courts more difficult.  The protection of the 
human rights of defendants before the ICTR is next examined by Wolfgang 
Schomburg and Jan Christoph Nemitz, while Simon M. Meisenberg surveys 
the jurisprudence of the Tribunal to assess how the fundamental human right 
to legal assistance was protected by the Tribunal in its work. Useful 
comparisons between the ICTR statute and decisions of the Tribunal versus 
international and regional human rights instruments and international case law 
makes it clear that the ICTR often went far beyond the requirements of 
international human rights norms to protect the due process rights of 
defendants. 
Beyond the jurisprudence of the ICTR, From Human Rights to 
International Criminal Law tackles general issues of international criminal 
law and the nascent International Criminal Court as well as issues of African 
law. Of particular note are essays by William A Schabas who analyzes the 
requirement of independence and impartiality of the International Criminal 
Judiciary, and Fatou Bensouda’s contribution on gender and sexual violence 
under the Rome statute. With regard to African law, the volume looks at the 
African Human Rights system and humanitarian law issues in Africa with 
contributions addressing mercenary activities and conflict prevention, peace 
negotiation, and international efforts to combat the impunity that perpetrators 
of grave violations of human rights have often enjoyed in the past on the 
continent. 
This collection of essays is well indexed, boasting both a subject and 
name index, so readers should encounter no difficulty in locating needed 
references. All told, From Human Rights to International Criminal Law : 
Studies in Honour of an African Jurist, the Late Judge Laïty Kama serves the 
memory and work of Judge Kama well, and its expansive scope underscores 
the many contributions the man and the tribunal he served so faithfully made 
to the development of international criminal law. The wealth of cutting-edge 
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Retrospectivity and the Rule of Law. By Charles Sampford. Oxford; New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2006. Pp. v, 308. ISBN-13 978-0-19-825298-
6. UK£68.00; US$130.00. 
 
Retrospectivity has a bad reputation in the legal community. In 
societies that follow the “rule of law,” we dislike any sort of law-making that 
has retroactive consequences as we seem to believe this is inherently unjust. 
However, Professor Charles Sampford dispels this notion in this very 
comprehensive look at retrospectivity. Sampford concludes that 
retrospectivity is not a rare occurrence, nor is it contrary to the rule of law. In 
fact, retrospectivity is a common tool that already fits into our notions of 
fairness. This book shows us how to view retrospectivity in this new light. 
Sampford uses examples, mainly from Australia, Great Britain, and the Unites 
States, to highlight his argument. A concise, seven-chapter book, this volume 
looks at retrospectivity from all angles and provides new ways of looking at 
this concept that can be employed by the legal scholar and practitioner alike. 
Early in the book, Sampford attempts to define retrospectivity. He is 
able to trace the basic concept back to Ancient Greece and up through current 
legal systems. Although there is no uniformly agreed upon definition, it is 
agreed that retrospective laws alter the future legal consequences of past 
actions or events. This is most obvious in criminal law and procedure cases, 
beginning with the Nuremberg Trials, which actually sparked the modern 
debate on retrospectivity. But this definition is too simplistic as it does not 
take into account the every-day cases of retrospectivity occurring in judicial 
decisions or legislation. 
Sampford next attempts to define the rule of law and, like 
retrospectivity, cannot come to a uniform definition. The mainstay of the rule 
of law is that it provides guidance; citizens should be able to act with certain 
expectations and can guide their actions to conform. These rules must be 
public and possible to comply with. Retrospectivity is often criticized for 
running contrary to this social norm. However, if we remove notions such as 
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retrospectivity completely from societies that follow the rule of law, we run 
the risk of blocking governmental pursuits of legitimate social goals (such as 
remedying a tax loophole). Further, by removing retrospectivity entirely, there 
are larger social consequences like preserving inequality and maintaining a 
status quo that favors those in power. 
The Rule of Law has a substantial normative force as a standard and 
our legal systems should aspire to this. However, Sampford urges us to look at 
retrospectivity not as a concept that runs contrary to the Rule of Law, but one 
that can be necessary depending on the circumstances in a given case. 
In the third chapter, Sampford identifies the arguments against 
retrospectivity. Some of the more common arguments are that retrospectivity 
is not democratic and that it violates human rights. However, he claims that 
this just isn’t so. By providing safeguards, we prevent egregious abuses. But 
the main reason we criticize retrospectivity is that it fails to provide the 
guidance and expectations required by the rule of law. Sampford is creative in 
the way he reconciles this. If we relied on the original law, for instance, a law 
that unintentionally allowed for a major tax loophole, we would not be 
rational. It is expected that a law such as that would need to be changed. Thus, 
retrospectivity as a concept fits neatly into modern legal systems. 
Sampford proceeds to identify the types of retrospective law making. 
He notes that retrospective legislation is such a common occurrence that 
surveying all of it would be impracticable. His main focus in this section, 
therefore, is on Australian restrospectivity. Curative retrospectivity is the 
largest class and the least controversial. If a law has an error or an unintended 
consequence, people will expect it to be changed. Retrospective criminal laws 
are extremely controversial but so rare they warrant little discussion. 
Retrospective taxation laws are also uncommon but very controversial (in the 
1970’s and 80’s Australia had a spate of tax schemes that have caused a 
backlash).  Judicial retrospectivity happens all of the time and is the most 
common. Judges can overrule, extend, distinguish, and limit, and there is no 
review beyond their decisions. Sampford calls for a uniformity among 
jurisdictions so decisions that have a retrospective effect will not be viewed as 
arbitrary or activist. 
Finally, Sampford outlines the justifications for retrospectivity in 
contemporary society. This novel approach provides positive reasons to 
proceed with this legal concept that has traditionally been reviled. Such 
justifications include remedying a necessary evil such as war crimes or tax 
schemes, better rules (curative reforms), better authorities (new laws once 
undemocratic governments are overthrown), efficiency, and, finally, fairness.  
Sampford offers us compelling examples from actual cases to 
highlight the benefits of retrospectivity and the dangers of overruling it 
outright. One case involved a Tasmanian man accused of murder. During the 
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time the crime was committed, a unanimous verdict was not required. Prior to 
the trial, the legislature changed the law to require a unanimous verdict in 
murder cases. The defendant challenged his conviction based on 
retrospectivity and won. But, as Sampford asks, is this fair? Did the defendant 
rely on the guidance of the initial law when he committed his crime? Since he 
did not, this case would have called for retrospectivity. 
Sampford concludes that a case can be made for retrospectivity if 
legislatures and judiciaries do the following: draw on the principles of judicial 
analyses (like coherence and the “better rule” theory), draw on equitable 
analyses of keeping promises, evaluate the “clean hands” or the conduct of the 
party claiming reliance, prefer “prospective retrospectivity” by giving indicia 
of change, implement new laws immediately and have them apply to all past 
behavior, not allow for the reliance on unintended consequences, not allow for 
criminally sourced immunity, and, finally, only use retrospectivity rarely in 
criminal matters.  
This book provides a novel approach to a concept that is usually only 
discussed in a negative light. It is thoroughly researched and accessible to 
read. It has widespread appeal for scholars but can also be used practically as 
guidance in fair law-making. 
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